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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
A  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  t h e s i s  o f  t h e  m e t a -
p h y s i c  o f  t h e  n o n - d u a l  t h a t  " t h e  w o r l d  w e  a r e  c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  
i s  n o t h i n g  h u t  w o r d s ,  w o r d s ,  w o r d s "  i s  a  d i f f i c u l t  o n e  u p o n  
w h i c h  t o  e m b a r k : .  T h e  d i f f i c u l t y  d o e s  n o t  l i e  i n  a s s u m i n g  
t h i s  a r g u m e n t ,  h u t  i n  e x a m i n i n g  i t  f r o m  t h e  o p p o n e n t ' s  p o s i ­
t i o n .  I t  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a n  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  M e w  Y o r k  G i a n t s  
i n  3  r o o k l y n .  i f  w e  a s s u m e  t h e  t h e s i s  o f  t h e  m e t a p h y s i o  o f  t h e  
n o n - d u a l ,  f i n d i n g  t h e  p r o p e r  a r g u m e n t s  a n d  q u o t a t i o n s  t o  s u b ­
s t a n t i a t e  i t s  c l a i m s ,  a l l  t h a t  w e  w o u l d  b e  d o i n g  i s  c l a i m i n g  
a  v i c t o r y  f o r  " o u r  s i d e *  w h e n ,  i n d e e d ,  n o  b a t t l e  h a d  b e e n  
f o u g h t .  T h e  i s s u e  i s  n o t  t h a t  w h a t  h a s  b e e n  s a i d  c a n  h e  s a i d ,  
b u t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  v a l i d i t y  i n  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  a n d  a  t r u t h  i n  
t h e  a s s e r t i o n s .  A s  p l e a s a n t  a s  i t  m i g h t  b e  t o  f i n d  Q u o t a t i o n s  
t o  s u p p o r t  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  i t  w o u l d  h a v e  l i t t l e  v a l u e  i f  o u r  
s o u r c e s  w e r e  a l l  o n e - s i d e d .  T o  r e t u r n  t o  a n  e a r l i e r  a n a l o g y ,  
i f  t h e  i s s u e  w e r e  w h e t h e r  t h e  G i a n t s  h a v e  t h e  b e t t e r  t e a m ,  
w e  c e r t a i n l y  s h o u l d  n o t  c o n f i n e  o u r  i n q u i r i e s  t o  o n l y  G i a n t  
f e n s .  T h e  i s s u e  i s  q u i t e  s i m p l e  a n d  c l e a r .  O n e  m u s t  f i n d  
i n  e v e n  t h a  ? .  r o o k l y n  f a n s  a  t a c i t  a g r e e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  G i a n t s  
a r e  a  s u p e r i o r  t e a m ,  o r ,  p u t t i n g  o u r  p l a y f u l  a n a l o g y  a s i d e ,  
o n e  m u s t  f i n d  i n  e v e n  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  a n t a g o n i s t ' s  t h e s i s  a  
l a r g o  p l a c s  f o r  t h e  f i n a l  p r o n o u n c e m e n t  u p o n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
t h e  p h e n o m e n a l  w o r l d  o f  t h e  m e t a p h y s i o  o f  t h e  n o n - d u a l .  T h e  
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advan t age s  a r e  o f  cou r se  obv i ous  even  t ho u g h  i t  E i igh t  be  a  
more  d i f f i cu l t  t a sk .  Bu t  t h i s  i s  a lways  t he  r o l e  o f  t he  
my th i ca l  h e r o .  I f  w e  mom en ta r i l y  f o rge t  t ha t  t he  we a pons  
a r e  o n ly  pape r  and  t y pewr i t e r  and  t he  a rmor ,  r he to r i c ,  we  
c an  t he n ,  pe rhaps ,  s ee  t he  co r r e s pondence .  The  p r e sen t  
f a sh ion  i n  ph i l o s ophy  o r  a t  l e a s t  t he  mos t  voce l  and  voc i f ­
e rous ,  i s  t he  f o r t h r i gh t  den i a l  o f  me t aphys i c s  a s  a  va l i d  
i n t e l l e c tua l  pu r s u i t  -  even  i n  p r i n o ip l e .  I t  i s  v . i t h  t h i s  
s choo l  t ha t  we  e nc oun t e r  ou r  f i r s t  d i f f i cu l t i e s .  Th u s ,  i f  
we  c a n  d i s ce rn  i n  t he i r  w r i t i ngs  -  the  c r i t i c s  o f  t he  me ta -
phys io  o f  t he  n o n -d u a l  and  mys t i c i sm  -  a  me taphys i ca l  b i a s  
a s  we l l  a s  e i t he r  an  imp l i c i t  o r  exp l i c i t  u s e  o f  wha t ,  f o r  
t he  mome n t ,  we  may  c a l l  t yp i fy ing  r e a l i t y  a s  a  wo rd  s t r uc ­
t u r e ,  t hen  we  c an  c l a im  no t  on ly  a  v i c to r y ,  bu t  an  a l l y  e v e n  
i f  t hey  may  p r e f e r  a  d i sg u i s e .  
Again, if  we are fortunate enough to see this pattern 
with the concomitant parts we have mentioned, then it  would 
be interesting, if one la not interpolating too far, to uti­
lize this as a tool for analytical purposes in other kindred 
fields to see if a general thesis could be maintained to sub­
stantiate the non-dualist's claim where the oritics might not 
have lingered. Thus, if  the same form can be discovered, an 
underlying thought process may bo discerned that wall may prove 
interesting as well as provide a way of handling thought while 
escaping the dangers of dogmatlcism. If so, this may be the 
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ana logue  t o  t he  non -du a l i s t ' a  t he s i s  p r e sen t ed  i n  a  r a t i o na l  
c o n t ex t .  
A  word  o f  oau t i on #  howeve r .  One  n u s t  r e ca l l  t he  
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There is a view current among intellectual ciroles 
that If Eastern philosophies are to be studied, it should 
only be for whatever historical or anthropological value 
they may possess. Actually, this Is quite consistent with 
the contemporary fashion and not necessarily a function of 
the Western world's narcisstio preoccupation with itself. 
Indeed, the riches of Eellenlc philosophy, to mention only 
one paramount example, are today studied In Just this sterile 
manner. Whatever is salvaged is utilized as an introduction 
into philosophy, and usually a history of philosophy at that. 
There oertainly seem to be assignable reasons for relegating 
theories and developed philosophies into this role - it is 
simply that the content of these ideas do not agree with 
the presuppositions of our present intellectual climate. 
The immediate implication is that the "system" that is engag­
ing in this value Judgment is in possession of a tool which 
is capable of determining truth, or at least capable of es­
tablishing a valid criterion of meaning. Such a school exists 
- the logical positivists. It might be exceedingly redundant 
to recapitulate the rise of this modern philosophy to this 
present lofty vantage point, but what needs be said is that 
the English school of empiricism has dominated the scene for 
some time and its heir, logical positivism, is the present 
spokesman for vast numbers of intelligent people. They are 
the latest of a long list of critics of mystical philosophies 
2 
and, at least for the moment, the articulate spokesmen. for 
this public climate of thought. 
They are not specifically prejudiced against Eastern 
systems of thought, but are rather against all  flights of 
thought that might In any way carry the appellation of the 
metaphysioal.  if  this criticism is valid, then their con­
tention to relegate these systems of thought into the back­
ground Is also correct.  Naturally, i t  follows that anyone 
engaged in the task of understanding these systems with any 
other goal excluding, of course, the esthetio, is like a man 
trying to awaken a corpse from sleep. Let us see if their 
analysis is correct and if the treatment of the oorpse must 
be abandoned. 
A methodological approach might be to view the 
claims and the counter-claims carefully and choose between 
them. Our own favorite prediliotions then would resolve the 
issue satisfactorily. Of oourse, nothing would be solved -
each would olaim a victory, neither one understanding the 
issue within the terms of the protagonist to see if there is 
a basic contradiction underlying his system, or if his claims 
are dogmatio pronouncements without sufficient cognitive 
grounds to Justify the assertions. This then is the methodolo­
gical approach, but there is always a necessity to ohoose the 
protagonist *s representative with care for a weak opponent is 
no opponent at all .  Therefore, this paper will take the log-
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leal poaitivist, whom even logical positivists take to their 
bosom, Mr. A* J. Ayer, and draw arguments from his book, 
"Language, Truth and Logic*. 
But a word of caution - In an analysis of differ­
ent philosophical systems there is a temptation to equate 
concepts from the different systems of thought whenever 
correspondences between terms can readily be drawn. But 
this is really illicit since frctn their total aspects the 
systems may be the very antithesis of each other. Any at­
tempt to reduce such a concept to the other by an analysis 
of individual concepts without reference to the system from 
which it has been spawned is bound to be deceptive; or, to 
invoke a principle of logio for assistance, it must be re­
membered that correspondences do not make equalities. It 
Is not important that there nay be analogous conoepta in 
these different systems. Y.hat is of paramount importance 
is why such concepts are being so employed. Seen in this 
perspective their relevance within each system will then be 
clearly delineated and, naturally, the correspondences will 
be relegated to a thing of minor importance. The alternative 
would be that different systems of thought can bs understood 
by reference to common denominators and, therefore, it would 
seem legitimate to say that they were not separate systems 
to begin with, which of course is self-contradictory. That 
this concept of common denominators makes fine mathematics 
Is undoubtedly true but aj philosophy It  la ruinous• 
Let us sea this more conoretely. Logical posi-
tITIsm claims to be a foe of metaphysics. Indeed, they have 
even claimed to have eliminated i t .  Be that as It  may, on 
the other side we see the same spirit  in Buddhism towards 
metaphysical questions. The Buddha was said to have abhored 
all  such questions on the basis that they were unimportant 
in the spiritual quest.  On the basis of this similarity, 
la i t  legitimate to assert that these different systems can 
be seen as functions of one another? There are even some 
who claim, on the basis of this apparent similarity, that 
Buddhism is,  therefore, closer to modern thought and hence 
is more acceptable. The spirit  that guides them both, they 
add, is similar and, therefore, Buddhism oan fear no abuse 
from the vociferous ravings of the other. Such appears to 
be the argument -  let us examine i t  more olosely. 
Buddhism asserts that metaphysical propositions 
are empty words that engulf one even more in the world of 
Samsara, and all  such questions. It  adds, is like trying to 
put legs on a snake. Logloal positivism also declares meta­
physical propositions to be nothing but empty words without 
any possible referent, but the oonsequenoes are vastly differ 
ent.  To the positivist the effeot is to be free from the wab 
of metaphysical speculation leaving one free to roam the com-
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nonsense world unhindered by any abstract flight of reasoning 
— free to be oonoerned with what the Buddhist calls Sams&ra, 
the oonunon-sense world in which we seek to satisfy our de­
sires and ambitions, cn the other hand, the logioal posi-
tiviet would, be quick to point out that the four noble truths 
of Buddhism are abstract metaphysical assertions, and, to be 
consistent, the Buddhist should also dispense with these 
"truths" and become a logioal positivist. 
The logioal posltivlst 's assertion that there are 
meaningless propositions, also assumes that some questions 
are meaningful. It is to these latter questions that nan's 
attention, they olaim, should be turned. In the verification 
of these questions and propositions, a body of propositions 
are said to become meaningful. But, to the Mystio, especially 
the Zen Buddhist, there are no questions that are meaningful. 
Some questions are tolerated for pragmatio purposes, but these 
cannot be said to belong to the body of propositions in which 
one can find meaning. Meaning is only in the insight into 
Sunya, the non-dual, and certainly not found in any proposi­
tion. Zen Buddhism can be said to answer metaphysical ques­
tions by giving a soeminglass paradoxical answer, which 
nevertheless is attempting to point out to the questioner 
the duality inherent in the question, i .e., the meaninglsas-
ness of his question. To the Buddhist, the principle of veri­
fication would be a "principle" of the experience of non-
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duality. To the logical positivist, the metaphysical ques­
tions can have no meaning because they are inherently mean­
ingless, but to the zen teaoher they are the material through 
which it is necessary to convey the essential non-dual 
charaoter of reality. Thus, one would point to them as in­
herently meaningless while the Zen would take oocasion to 
utilize these propositions in a meaningless way to bring on 
the most meaningful: 
EXAMPLE: 
The Bodhidarma was said to have gazed before 
a blank wall meditating for twelve years, a 
meditation known as the P'ei Kwan, and at 
this time Hui-K'e came before the Bodhidarma 
with his right arm amputated as a token of 
his ainoerity. He approached the Bodhidarma 
giving him hie lifeless arm saying, "I have 
no poacs of mind, please pacify my mind". 
The Bodhidarma replied, "Bring your mind out 
before me and I will pacify it*. "Yvhen I  look 
for my mind," Eui K'e said, "I cannot find it 
to bring it out". To which the reply was, 
"There I have pacified your mind", and at this 
moment Bui K'e was said to have been enlightened. 
The logical positivist would point out the psychological 
character of this tale and that the lack of any empirioal 
content to either observe or to ascertain its predictability 
makea this therefore quite outside the realm of concern for 
any rational investigation. Thus, the problem should be 
rejected. Further, it  appears that no possible substitu­
tion of terms could render this a meaningful question. 
The entire content Is subjective and therefore beyond the 
multiplicative corraborative method of the positivist. As 
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£ folk-tale It tails of something, perhaps the presentment 
of an ideal, but as a cognitive experience it contains little. 
It Is further, quite obviously, not an assertion that can be­
long to a body cf statements that can be said to be meaning­
ful within the definition of their terms. Therefore, it is 
a folk-tale that records the way in which Hui K'e talked and 
the manner in which the Bodhidarma replied but to which little 
cognitive claim can possibly be predicated. To tho Buddhist, 
this tale does have many of the features that the logical 
positivist enumerates, yet the consequences are vastly differ­
ent. The question that Hui K'e puts to the Bodhidarma lias 
no moaning, if we mean by meaning the same as tho logical 
positivist. But no-meaning In the Buddhist's context is 
that there i3 no way to pacify the mind If there Is no mind 
to pacify. Nor, could there be any way In which it could be 
rendered meaningful, that is, within the llngulstio frame­
work of a non-dual system. If reality can be said to be non-
dual, it precludes there being any final distinction between 
the mind and any other thing. Hui K'e asked the question with 
sincerity and humility knowing his mind needed to be pacified. 
He betrayed by his question a basic dualism in his thinking, 
i.e., there Is a mind and there is pacification, or there 
Is peace and sorrow. He knew sorrow on such intimate terms 
that It was more important for him to sever his aria giving 
It to the Bodhidarma as a token of his sincerity In the hopes 
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of realizing his peaoe of mind* Nevertheless, he still  saw 
the world in terms of oppoeites, as dichotomies and therefore 
he was still  in the realm of S&msara. The Bodhidanna with 
an economy of words clearly displayed the duality inherent 
in his thinking. Eui K'e's realization of this was suffi­
cient as a psychological lever to turn about his conscious­
ness to realization. Thus, this is a folk-tale with high 
cognitive content capable of teaching that insight wherein 
reality is perceived as non-dual. Thus, there are two 
systems with similar approaches with vastly different ends. 
It  might be better to see the logical posittvtst 's 
position within the terms of his own system and judge i t  on 
i ts own standing rather than in how l i t t le or much they are 
able to interpret this tale. 
All philosophic systems make cognitive claims. 
Their assertions are embodied in a llngulstio form, and i t  
is from this form that logical positivists begin their 
analysis and examination, what they ask is,  what is the 
principle of verification necessary to establish a statement 
as meaningful. Sinoe all  statements can be translated Into 
propositions, the task is determining the valid uses of 
propositions* Thus, a meaningful proposition is either 
analytic or aynthetio, we are told, and they are, therefore, 
the only valid forms of propositions. The determination of 
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validity for synthetic proposit ions is  whether i t  is  possible 
to enter into certain observations,  under certain conditions,  
and to accept or reject  the proposit ions as being ei ther true 
or false• This is  the appeal to the empirical  or our common-
sense experience,  i t  is  saying in essence that  certain ob­
servations are necessary and relevant in verifying an asser­
t ion as being true or false.  Within this class of assert ions,  
there are strong and weak verifications! the strong being the 
immediate t ie to sense-data and the weak providing a probable 
t ie to sense-data.  Thus,  i t  follovs that  only empirical  
proposit ions have faotual content and that  this body of 
proposit ions provides a rule for the antiolpation of expe­
rience.  Naturally,  then,  only the tautologloal proposit ions 
of the analytlo class and synthetic proposit ion provide the 
olaas of al l  significant proposit ions.  One of the leading 
protagonists for this school of thought,  Mr. A* J .  Aysr,  aum-
marizes this posit ion in his theory of t ruth.  He says,  "For 
i t  is  easy to see that  the purpose of a  ' theory of t ruth '  is  
simply to desoribe the cri teria by which the validity of the 
various kinds of proposit ions is  determined".^ He oonoludes 
o 
that  al l  questions of the form, "What is  the Dature of x" 
are simply a request  for a definit ion.  Which is  to say i t  
Is a request  for a definit ion of the particular in ques­
t ion as a symbol in use.  This is  done by substi tution of "x* 
*A. J .  Ayer,  Language, Truth & Logic,  (London, Victor,  Gollanoz,  
Ltd., 1948), p. 87 
2  Ibid. ,  pS8 
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for a synonym. An example might be fruitful at this point. 
(A) "What la the nature of Truth"? 
this Is reduced to -
(A^) "What Is Truth"? 
and again, "(the proposition Ai) proposition Is.true" 
whioh is equal to -  "proposition exists" 
But since existence is not c predicate, to say that proposi­
tion Is true is only to assert its existence. Thus, there 
is no need to further analyze it.  To assert a proposition 
Is true is simply a way of asserting the proposition. 
Propositions asserting the existence of god, truth, 
reality, eunya and the ultimate ground are, thus, not genuine 
propositions. Two criticisms are levelled against suoh 
propositionsj one that they are tautologies and yet are not 
themselves meant to be analytic propositions and further that 
they are Incapable of being verified by any emplrloal test. 
It Is Important to note here that this empirical test means 
that it is incapable of being corroborated by any other 
person*s experience, i .e., by any observer of the sense-
experience. The existence of God, or any such proposition, 
Mr. Ayer writes, "if probable, then the proposition that he 
exlated would he an empirical hypothesis. And in that case 
it would be possible to deduce it ,  and other empirical 
hypotheses, oertain experimental propositions which*»re not 
d e d u o i b l e  f r o m  t h o s e  o t h e r  h y p o t h e s e s  a l o n e . W h i c h ,  h e  
hastily adds, is not probable, nevertheless, certain men 
1  Ibid., p. 118 
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do have mystical experiences and these surely bear evidence 
to the oontrary. Not quite. For this experience is not a 
genuine cognitive state because there can be no emplrloal 
test to validate this knowledge. There oould be no observer 
entering into and sharing the experience of the participant 
and still  claim to be an observer. The further objection is 
that the individual oannot reveal Just what he explicitly "knows". 
Thus, the myatlo»s olaim is not substantiated. 
Empirioal data then beooaea the only valid form of 
acceptable evidenoe. Ideal data becomes pointer readings 
and their possible correlations and where they are insuf­
ficient,  logical data is supplemented to Justify the tran­
sition. Ideally, facts are synthetio propositions and ana­
lytic propositions. Logical tautologies fill  in the gaps 
of this systematic body of knowledge. Thus, iogioal posi-
tivists claim their system to be a deductive system whioh is 
validated throughout by empirical and logloal data. They 
olaim to bo able to correlate all  genuine propositions, which 
is another way of saying they claim to be able to justify 
the assertion that there is no neoessity for dealing with 
any of the various forms of metaphysics. The world of signi­
ficant faots can be understood and comprehended within the 
logloal positivlst 'a system. Therefore, they are the unique 
custodian of the truth. Other propositions and assertions 
not meeting their oriteria belong to the olass of meaningless 
propositions and as such can be of no interest to any man of 
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reason* All significant facts can be bandied by this ayetem 
and only these are genuine propositions. 
It is easily seen that this Is an Ideal -  an ideal 
that may or may not be realized in the future. At present 
only a certain area of solence#  physics and chemistry, oan 
be said to meet this rigid standard. Further, even in these 
fields, there Is no longer that return to observation that 
once characterized the aoienoes. Today it la a rare situa­
tion that finds a scientist engaged in primary emplrioal sense-
data) he Is rather engaged in dial readings, pointer readings, 
and the analysis of negative plates, ourved lines traced on 
reams of paper as well as speotrosooplc analysis of photographio 
plates - no longer the immediate fact of sense data but tha 
algn of the sense—data.: Indeed, today the most advanced 
sciences are concerned with interpretation of signs within 
a fremework of possible meaning that actually has Its origin 
in a body of purely indirect faets. It might be pertinent 
to recall that logical positivism rests Its cognitive claim 
upon data and Indirect data that may be inferred from these 
primary data. But what is indirect data? Especially since 
they disparage any systematic Weltanschauung. It Is obviously 
a retreat Into that very realm that they disparage; to the 
land of inferred fact, of probable eonjeofcures and "likely 
facts" necessary to Invoke in order to systematize their data. 
Indirect data la the foundation of all Weltanachauungs. 
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Pacts themselves are not sufficient or rich enough to present 
a coherent view of even the smallest field of scientific en­
deavor. Indirect facts are Just those elements that are not 
observable and yet are not the logical ties from the class of 
analytic propositions. Thus, in principle, they fall short 
of bheir own goal. 
Yet the Achillea1  heel of logical positivism is 
in oomplete trust in eaoh man corroborating the evidence of 
his predecessor and the assertion that this is the only sure 
basis upon which to build an edifice of knowledge, if there 
are any disagreements, the arbitrator, they say, is the 
empirically verified evidence. The difficulty in this thesis, 
aside from its obvious cognitive attractiveness, is that it 
is an appeal to a prinoiple. Whenever a principle is uti­
lized as a foundation for dogmatism, the same test is inva­
riably utilized to elucidate the error. I.e., locate a dis­
agreement among those claiming the same principle and it 
will be seen that they resolve their difficulty by recourse 
to another devioej that is, they abandon the principle and 
seek some other way out. This new device is always in terms 
of their system, or in terms of structural data that they found 
expedient to build; which is to say, in terms of their own 
Weltansohauung. Rather than rethink the basis of their cog­
n i t ive  s t ruc tu re ,  they  t end  to  fo rce  the  rebe l l ious  f ac t  O P  
data into the mold of their own predilections. This only 
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points out the fact that they are only one philosophy among 
many. Since theirs does not embody a self-oonsistent and 
logically rigorous system throughout, they oan claim no pri­
ority for their own system except on the basis of dogmatic 
appeal* A further objection to the principle of verification 
is that verification Itself depends upon the definitions, 
which they themselves oarefully have developed which are 
built upon linguistic rules* The fact to be verified will 
necessarily have to be defined in terms of the fact itself* 
Thus, a fact is not in any strict sense verified but theorized. 
Goethe rightly saw this when he said, nDas Hoohste ware zu 
hegreifen, dass alias Faktiache schon Theorie ist." 
There is another side of the appeal on which to 
rest cognitive claims and that is the psychological. It 
matters little whether the cognitive criterion is grounded 
in an infallible authority or on the grounds of certainty 
since the net results are equivalent* The seamy side of any 
religious system of thought shows itself without much acute 
analysis to rsst Itself upon belief. It is even considered 
a virtue to utilize belief. Recourse to belief presupposes 
doubt and it necessarily loses much to insecurity as a direot 
result. Thus, an appeal to an ultimate authority releases 
one from insecurity and doubt and wraps the sensitive soul with 
a protection from the consequences of doubt. Whatsver respon­
sibility one may have is lifted from tho mind by this retreat 
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Into a principle of ultimate authority. The difficulty lies 
In determining what is oertaln and just what la authoritarian. 
What is undoubtedly certain cannot by definition be doubted -
at least thle was their intention. When, occasionally, this 
principle was not seriously questioned the psychological ef­
fects were clearly manifested. The principle gained Its 
life from the devotees? the idea became the Idol lo the market 
place and the Individual Invariably became. In time, the saorl-
fioe. All was secure. Man's inner freedom and the possibility 
of his own individual growth was stolen from him and he received 
in return the security from doubt and uncertainty. History 
Is a record of what follows. There oomes a time when the 
authorities disagree among themselves as to what must be 
authoritarian. They interpret differently. At euob times 
the conflict is painful and the competence of the authority 
la often questioned by recourse to other criteria. From such 
situations as these can be traced much of the Church's histor­
ical arguments and at these times there was always a reoourse 
to other considerations such as common sense, natural reason, 
hamony of the gospels, and the dietlnotion between the pas­
sive and active intellect,  which of oourse is a tacit admis­
sion of fallibility. Therefore, ae an ultimate criterion, 
the principle was resolved In terras of secondary considerations. 
Regardless of the rhetorlo employed, the result was an aban­
donment of the ultimate principle as an Infallible cognitive 
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principle. The so-oalled Ago of Reason simply utHired this 
secondary principle as their mainstay and built their own spu­
rious edifice from such a foundation. They substituted clear 
and distinct ideas and empirieal faot. Both of these have 
in our own times been seen to be illegitimate retreats from 
reason. Cases to note are the fall of the Euolldian geometry 
as a body of certain principles as well as Newtonian physios. 
As for the principle of the indubitable fact, we can compare 
the writings of pragmatiste, H. H. Prloe and J. Dewey, and 
find no possible mutually consistent descriptions of just 
what is indubitable about a "feet".1  Yet, they should agree. 
This then is another case where an appeal is made without suf­
ficient cognitive evidence to justify the principle in question. 
The same basic pattern is being employed, the only difference 
being that ultimate authority has given way to indubitable 
fact and both are then seen as dogmatio assertions without 
the grounds to justify the step. Thus, this appears again 
to be nothing more than a need to invoke a psychological tie 
when evidence or a logical jump is plainly locking, i .e., a 
metaphysioal assertion. To oomplete this historical process 
we see today indubitable fact withdrawing from the throne 
and the principle of verification newly crowned. Naturally 
the same criticism is still valid. 
Logioal positivism oan be seen to be a dogmatio 
1 H. H. Price, Perception (London: Methuen, 1932) p. 3 
Cf. J. Dewey, experience and Nature (Chicago: open Court, 
1925) pp. 21-22 
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system of thought that makes large cognitive olaima without 
sufficient cognitive grounds for their beliefs. As a dog­
matic system, the claims to have eliminated metaphysios are 
themselves illegitimate propositions. Thus, they are guilty 
of having evolved a metaphysics without acknowledging it to 
be a member of this very class. They have denied what they 
themselves preaoh and therefore oan be classed as a metaphysics 
hostile to other metaphysioal systems. The principle of veri­
fication Is the same retreat from reason to a psychological 
land of security as that of an appeal to ultimate authority 
or the indubitable fact. The Buddhist nevertheless has close 
affinities with positivists for he too holds that one must 
judge on the grounds of experience against the background of 
the contingencies of one's own life. He also agrees with the 
test of knowledge as being oonalstent with the experience of 
others who have undergone a similar state. The only differ­
ence is in how much the term knowledge shall inolude. They 
even engage in the serious quest of returning to the question, 
•What are the actual experiences and observations that find 
their expression in a specifio word, a sentence or theory".^ 
The difference again lies in the determination of how much 
content, or how far the observer intends to enter in his veri­
fication. Fundamentally, logical positivism claims preference 
for the realm of common sense, yet it  does not seem to be able 
to extricate itself from the prejudices of common sense. It 
1  Richard Von Mlses, Positivism, (Harvard University Press 
Cambridge, 1951), p* 22 
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g t  be bettor to examine positivism from the aspect of psycho­
logical systems of security neoessary for contemporary man to 
function, but this paper is a philosophical analysis and there­
fore this delightful tangent must be resisted somewhat. I t  
has often been said that logical positivism is a system of 
thought formulated from the principles of soisnoe which has 
given the scientist the elbow-room he needs to work In the 
laboratory without those peaty eplatemologlcal questions that 
have beset the empiricist,  if  to, i t  has aohleved Its pur­
pose but only at the cost of rigor and logical scope. 
The corpse need not be revived alnce It  now appears 
that i t  was only sleeping and the logical poaitlvlat is only 
guilty of mistaking a state of slumber for that of death -
a mistake not uncommon for those whose thinking rests upon 
qulok analysis and hasty Judgments, 
Another aspect of this problem shows i tself to be 
In what Is meaningful. Putting this In another wey. I t  might 
be important to note that the Irrational Is denied. Only what 
can be formed In an ordered entity based upon the particular 
criteria is considered meaningful. But the Irrational Is 
real In spite of our inclination to appear aa an ostrich saob 
time we encounter the unusual or the Irrational. What can­
not be directly measured, weighed or Impartially observed 
need not be therefore meaningless -  only difficult to handle. 
To exclude the irrational In a mad world is atranga. Indeed, 
g ^theme for & comedy. The important thing is not to limit 
19 
the world before it  is known in all its fullness, but ta 
utilize the grandest assumption, to exolude nothing, so that 
one need not lament when he may have been joyous, jostle lam 
in Zen or Vedanta is not rational or irrational. It does not 
arbitrarily exolude anything. It only seeks to present its 
teaohlngs within the oonduct of the highest experience. 
Buddhism, as well as Zen Buddhism, is thus free from metaphys-
loal presuppositions, yet paradoxically it does make an asser­
tion. 
The assertion, as well as any consequences that 
might be drawn from this, must always be brought baok to the 
primal oonoept. It is the test as well as the principle — 
both the truth and its validation. It is simply that reality 
and truth are inseparable. There is no other test of truth 
than truth. There exists no "other" in a non-dualistio sys­
tem, for this is the principle of the non-dual nature of 
reality, it is in this sense that Sunyata and prajna can be 
understood - it is the truth and reality. It is the ultimate 
experience and the statement of i t .  It is a marriage between 
the premise and the conclusion. It is a tautology, which is 
not to render it as a meaningless proposition since in this 
view the subjeot and object that are asserted are not differ­
ent in their underlying unity. Metaphysically, it  might be 
put in this form • ontologically, reality is but one essence. 
There is no "other" to oontrast it with, yet It is still a 
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one. Immediately It might be argued that *en««» can bavv* re an 
lag only ID oontrast to the many and therefore not even thla 
nay be said. This is somewhat hasty si.noe if we retrieve the 
Greek concept of Dumber it  oaa afford us a nay of asserting 
this without meeting the usual logical pitfalls* To say it 
is one essence is to say that the one in question is not a 
number* • One is not a number* It is, rather# that by which 
numbers are measured. It cannot be a measure of Itself, for 
that is really tautological* It ia & unity different from 
other numbers* Five is a number, being a unity of the addi­
tion of 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, and each one is itself not measured. 
One is a unity in the sense that nothing stands outside it.  
One is the purest abstraction - it contains neither parts nor 
others. Thus, reality can be characterised In this sense, 
but only if we also assert that it is not an abstraction 
void of content, but rather that which is beyond all pos­
sible predications. It is similar to liirguna Brahmen in 
Indian thought* It is beyond all verbal qualifications. 
Its richness is beyond our conceptual forrnulatioD. 
II An Edifice Upon which to Build Logic 
The other side of the posltivlst 's system, whloh 
we have only mentioned lightly before, lies in that strange 
class of propositions the logician calls the analytlo. We 
have done this with good reason, for the entire edifice rests 
upon a thesis that needs prior analysis. Tha structure upon 
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which the logical theories of the posltivist rests have boen 
carefully elaborated by Ludwick Wittgenstein In his word, " 
"Tractatus Logico-Philnsophlcus". With echoes of Flato's 
"Ion" before us, we nrj3t remember that the artist is ignorant 
of the prinoiples upon which his art depends and, therefore, 
it must be to the principles that one Timet first look, not 
the conclusions, and whatever consequences they my have for 
login. To start anywhere else would only unduly complicate 
the examination by having to return to premises at a later 
time anyway. The heart of tho natter can readily be seen 
In Tifctgenstoin'3 assertion, 
"The proposition is a picture of reality." 
"The proposition is a model of the reality as we 
think it is." 4,01 
By knowing the contont of the proposition, assuming it as 
meaningful, we are led to cognitive content, 
"The proposition is a picture of reality for 
I know the state of affairs presented by it ,  
If I understand the proposition. And I 
understand the proposition, without its 
sense having been expleined to me." 4.021 
But, it  may be asked hexe does this avoid the solipsist 'e 
position of asserting this while still denying that It can 
have any external factor, i.e., that the world exists only 
within the confines of the cranium. For one to assume that 
the features expressible in language have an objective 
referent must be explained. Or, stated in another way, what 
are the arguments for assuming that language mirrors the 
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structure of reality? Being aware of this problem, Wittgen­
stein seeks to solve i t  by an appeal to a test of corrsspond-
ence with reality. He says, 
"The proposition determines reality to this 
extant, that one only noeds to say 'Yes'  
or 'No* to i t  to make i t  agree with reality. 
Reality must therefore be completely des­
cribed by the proposition. 
A proposition is the description of a faot.  
As the description of an object describes 
It  by i ts external properties so proposi­
tions describe reality by i ts internal 
properties. The proposition constructs a 
v/orld with the help of logloal soaffolding, 
and therefore one can actually see In the proposi­
tion all  the logloal features possessed by re­
ality if i t  is true, one oan drew conclusion* 
from a false proposition." 
4 .023 
Let U3 assume the above for the moment and state that what 
v/e seem to have is a knowledge of the world'* structure but 
no objects. It  also seems that one need not conoern one­
self with immediate reality, as such, but only with a set 
of propositions whi.oh may exhibit the structure of reality -
may "if i t  is true"* Actually, we are quite familiar with 
this methodological procedure for i t  has i ts modern origin 
with Descartes. It  involves assuming certain things as 
known and substituting for the unknown, and solving for the 
valuos based upon an algebraic substitution when equated with 
zero. Reality is being substituted by propositional lan­
guage and, therefore, what can be predicated of one can be 
inferred about the other. 
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3ut can 009 "actually see In the proposition all  
the logical features possessed by reality"f or, is It  not 
that by Inference certain deductions seem pertinent? But 
are they necessary in any strict sense? Indeed, why not be 
content to express the fact that what is revealed is only 
the structure of language. if  so, then it  Is the merest 
tautology •  x equals x. The reality expressed by propositions 
then would only be that of language and hardly that of the 
world. Asserting; the existence of an external reality, or 
structure of reality, does not, by the mere assertion, make 
i t  so, as Alice in bonder!and found out to fcer dismay. Yet, 
this is what Wittgenstein does assert,  "The world is the 
totality of facts, not of things". (1.1) F.ithin hie terns, 
language actually does convey a picture of reality. Lan­
guage, as propositions, holds up to nature a mirror and the 
logician reoltes the reflected image in a logical form. 
He says, "A proposition oen be true or false by being a pic­
ture of reality." (4.06) But the question -  how can that 
be verified? -  stems from the other side of the positivist 'a 
dootrine. We have seen that there are definite philosophical 
objeotions to the dootrine underlying the synthetic class of 
propositions being vindicated by the principle of verifica­
tion, and now i t  appears that the same issue is analogously 
before us. Can this foundation of the positivist 'a logical 
thesis be defended or is i t  a dogmatic appeal, or a weak 
philosophical thesis carefully camouflaged by a flow of 
rhetoric Just whore dialectic should have been employed to 
make explicit  latent ambiguities. The reality that has been 
reached is nothing more .than on idea. If the necessary de­
ductions are to be made,. i t  would appear that positivism 
moves into a form of Hegelian idealism, for that would assert 
that the idea and reality are equivalent. '  Naturally, they 
stop short before these consequences for theirs is a theory 
of knowledge and not a systematic metaphysical position. 
Nevertheless, if  this correspondence theory is assumed, we 
must then say that either ideas or facts do not belong with­
in reality, or else i t  would follow that if they do, what 
possible value would there be in comparing one aspect of 
reality with another in the quert of determining reality? 
How can this correspondence of one aspect with another of 
reality be said to present us with truth or falsity, if 
fact wa" corresponds with fact "b" and we see i ts logical 
structure then if this correspondence is to be applied i t  
mast be outside of reality. In order to apply the test of 
correspondence, i t  would appear that either the world is 
outside of reality or that the facts are, and this is 
manifestly absurd. If the facts fall  outside of reality-
whore is there room for them to fall? Then there crust 
he two realities and one must therefore fall  outside of our 
consciousness and from this, too, no possible principle can 
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bo determined. Or, again, are objects part of reality or 
is only the structure of reality reality? This would bo 
strange -  a structure without a thing with the structure. 
Empirically, we are confronted by objects and now i t  ap­
pears we only have ideas of structure and not things. Thus, 
in principle this theory of correspondency is fraught with 
assumptions, the value of which can only be maintained by 
not thinking through their consequences. Our confidence 
in language lies in our tacit assumption that reality is 
mirrored by i t  and therefore presents us a model of i t  • 
Thus, i t  appears again that the positivists are 
shown to be poor systematic philosophers. Poorly thought-
out premises beset their system. It  is really their meta­
physical bias that there exists an external world whioh 
exists independent in i ts own right and apart from the 
observer. In an attempt to provide firm ground, they claim 
that while experience is subjective, private and ineffable, 
i ts form, structure and "intelligible whatness" is public, 
objective and capable of being communicated. But, such an 
assertion is a metaphysical standpoint,  which is somewhat 
humorous, since they claim to have eliminated metaphysics 
from at least their own philosophy. 
The form, or rather name, of the proposition 
which modern positivists examine is,  of oourse, the dis­
cursive. There is no meaningful assertion beyond the limits 
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of disouraive language and It alone can bear the ideas of 
our intellectual activity, they maintain. Not only Wittgen— 
stein asserts this but also, among many others, Bertrand 
Russell.  He writes, 
nOur confidence in language is due to the faot 
that it  shares the structure of the physical 
world, and therefore it can express that 
structure. But if  there is a world that is 
not in space-time, it  may have a struoture 
which we can never hope to express or to 
know. 
Certainly, in assuming their premises we arrive at their ends, 
but only if  we are not bothered by their metaphysical skips 
and Jumps. But what reason do we have in granting this as­
sumption? Is it possible to handle language in any other 
manner while still  holding to the rigor necessary in any 
philosophical investigation? Is all  discursive thought 
restricted to the precise articulated eymboliam that these 
moderns have produced? Our language should convey precise 
meaning if  our concern is for logical rigor and meaning. 
This is tantamount to saying that it  should be free from 
metaphorlo linguistic ambiguities. Discursive language 
should be employed whonever possible to avoid possible confu­
sions. This Is the ideal and has its roots in classical 
times and in the medieval age. To facilitate this end, 
grammar was built to define and fix usages to coavey our thought 
processes. The distinction of subject, verb and objeot owes 
Its exlstenoe to this ideal, propositions are said to be able 
to be reduced to this three-fold division. There are further 
* Bertrand Russell,  philosophy, (W.V,. Norton & Co., 1936) 
p. 206 
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refinements of this thesis which have given rise to the dis­
tinctions between impositions and inventions. Such distinc­
tions keep us from misinterpreting linguistio categories. 
An example of this usage isi  
A Rose is a flower 
A flower is a word 
Therefore, a Roee is a word 
This two-fold division of the literal and the 
mefcaphorio needs careful examination. It  appears that the 
god, Janus, has been at work in our understanding of these 
types of statements. The l i teral statement upon analysis 
leads us to believe that It  must be taken metaphorically 
or else certain deductions lead us into a labyrinth of 
confusion. In Bradley's "Logic",! he attempts to prove 
or at least to justify his contention that every proposi­
tion necessarily embodies a subject which Is ultimate reality 
and hence each predicate seeks to prescribs to reality a 
predicate. He further states that every predicate has but 
one subject and that is ultimate reality, if so, then It  
would be necessary to add that all  literal propositions must 
be taken metaphorically. A proposition asserts existence and 
isolates i t  by predicating to the subject oertain attributes, 
yet these are not meant to be taken as entities apart from 
the reality which l ies at i ts basis. Actually, all  the prop­
osition asserts is a configuration within a certain space-
time continuum which may appear as separate but cannot be con-
1  F. H. Bradley, Logio, Bk. 1, Chap, n,  pp. 49#  50 #  
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aide red in this manner after the slightest philosophical 
scrutiny. 
111 " The Cones is of a  Naked Analogy 
The other aide of the difficulty is that most 
metaphors are taken l i terally which is  the basis of most 
difficulties.  The formal etruoture of metaphors is  seldom 
investigated and this is regrettable for,  if  i t  were, much 
confusion oould be dispelled. The danger of taking metaphors 
as l i teral statements oould also be lessened if  we oould 
f irst  see them undisguised. Borrowing the notational system 
of Euclid and also having recourse to his Fifth Book of 
Elements,  we oan easily develop the tools neoessary to un-
mask the zootaphorioal and analogical statements.  Uathe-
mat lea is  normally considered to be the study of the valid 
properties of proportion, but I t  is seldom remembered that 
"proportion" is a Latin translation of the creek word, 
"analogy". Also, i t  is often forgotten that the valid trans-
formations for propositions are also the valid transformations 
of analogies* 
The word, "analogy" and i ts latin brother,  "propor­
t ion", give us a glimpse into the veiled aspect of analogy 
by showing i ts progeny, mathematics.  An analogy involves, 
Euolid states,  at  least three terms and most usually four.  
These terms oan fce arranged in groups of two, eaoh term 
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having a relation to the other,  but I te relationship to the 
analogy la determined by the two groupe. Eaoh pair of re­
lated terms, or groups, is  oalled s  ratio* But,  two term* 
osn be related in innumerable ways and i t  becomes, there-
Tore, Important to hold the relation between ratios equal 
or same* This rest rioting of possible relations oan ba 
accomplished beoause at  least one relation is understood 
between the two terms of the first  ratio sod this must re­
main constant between the other ratio conneoted by a proper 
l ink* 
A statement of the analogy in i ts formal archetype 
form is written; 
A I B i t  C t  D 
and Is read, 
A Is to B as C la te D 
These ratios in analogical transformation develop 
other valid relations between terms In the analogy* The 
transformations of proportions follow the definitions of the 
Fifth Book of Euclid 's  Elements whloh gives the forms of 
inversion and alternation, 
B I A i t  D I  C (inversion) 
and 
A i  C n 9 l  D (alternation) 
Listing these transformations of analogies,  ws see that we 
are asserting that the first  ratio has a relation between i te 
nembera that 1= th» .»• "» ">• °«» r  r« t l 0* T h"*'  "  "" 
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sort in analogy, an ©quality or sameness In at least one 
respect between two ratios. And, further, that through 
the manipulations of terms, the relations remain valid. A 
r a t i o  m a y  b e  e x p r e s s e d  a a ,  
x R^X (and read as - x has a relation R^ to y)1  
The number of possible relations in a ratio or 
analogy are innumerable and it is only limited by the 
philosophical truth that, if not tautologies, they have at 
least one relation different. That is to say, that the 
sameness between terms is restrained by the essential other­
ness inherent in them. So a further change in our notation 
for analogies Is necessary. 
It Is interesting to speoulate that if one could 
knew all possible relations, one could include the entire 
universe less the basic otherness. 
An alternative form for the analogy is in a box-forn: 
w RjX a y R^z 
w R x :  j y R z 
2 2 
v R^x : :  y r^z 
w Vix y Viz 
1 .  a  b  
o  d  
2 .  a  b  c  d  
e  f  g  h  
3 .  a  b e  
d  e  f  
£  h  1  
^Whitehead & Russell (cf. infra p. 38) 
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and la read (1) a la to b as c Is to d, and (2) a la to b 
Is to c la to d as e is to f Is to g Is to b. The third 1* 
road In a like manner* The terns In eaob row are limited 
In the number contained In the primary row which necessarily 
contains the relational order* Those forms are familiar to 
the student of algebra and, indeed, bear a close relation to 
the determinants of algebra* This manner of arrangement in 
ordered rows and oolumns la an aid, for by choosing rectangles 
or squares from these matrices, we have legitimate trans­
formations of analogies* 
a is to g as b Is to h, or, a is to b as e is to t 
(note rectangle figure in »3W).  Taking the archetypal 
analogy in this determinant form (1) we may have, reading 
left to right -
A s B s i C  * D  ( v e r s e )  
ri g h t to left B i  A II D i  C (inverse) 
down the columns A I C u B t D (alternando) 
up the columns C i  A i< D I B (inverse alternando) 
In these arrangements "A " can be a sign for any term ex­
clusive of the last "D", end in the inverted form *g* oan 
be the sign for any but "o*. 
A B 
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A modern Pythagorean or an enlightened mathematician should 
recognize an Important principle and should be able to under­
stand why the diagonal Is rot a valid transformation. 
It night be argued at this time that logical posi­
tivism and other doctrines do employ metaphors on occasion 
but that logic Is another completely different mods of rea­
soning and therefore this Is not exhaustive, Cranted that 
•propositions mirror reality" Is highly metaphorical but 
not so their main body of work. Logic when examined will 
disclose no analogical form, structure or matrix, and hence 
we might agree with the interesting analysis of analogy, but 
logic alone Is capable of handling non—metaphorlc thought 
for a philosophic purpose In an attempt to know and come Into 
contact with Eeing, Reality and the Cosmos itself even in 
an ontologloal and metaphysical status. Perhaps. Let us 
see If this Is Indeed so. 
Ill - (b) Logic or Analogy 
Aristotelian logic Is a static, rigid framework 
whioh has interesting presuppositions. It is static rather 
than dynamic Insofar as Its main utility lies in there being 
already established a valid science of classification where 
the main consideration rests not in the world of flux but In 
permanency. Its method is clearly one of substitution as 
w e l l  a s  i t s  p r o o f ,  i t s  w e l l  k n o w n  f o r m  i s j  
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All A is  B A is  B aod sometimes 
A1* C Is  A C is  A presented 
All  C is  B or  C is  B as.  
In uti l izing this Barbara syllogism of Aristotle 's  
logic,  we avoid the problem of the distr ibution of terms, 
but nevertheless the same argument can be applied to any of 
the other syllogisms. The proof,  i f  we can oall  i t  suoh, is  
simply by recourse to substi tution of terms. Thus,  we can 
transform this syllogism intoi  
All  A Is B but C equals A hence substi tute for 
A, C therefore C equals B 
or properly notated within our analogical  frame of reference,  
i t  would be i  
C  t B  i s C  l A  t h e r e f o r e  B  e q u a l s  A  
whereas if  Aristotelian logio were to f irst  substi tute un­
knowns for knowns i t  should read: 
All  C is  8 C is  B 
f  H g *8  A  C is  A 
All C is B o r c Is B 
Naturally this Is no longer the same problem since this la­
test transformation .hows It to be not a syllogism but part 
of onthymsms analysis. But this deductive loglo was meant 
to demonstrate end establish the neoessary truths of philos­
ophy revealed through reason. Yet. this la only a substitu­
tion which Is legitimate since It Is the known elements, the 
minor premise. The interesting thing Is In our corrected 
form. Be prove the major premise by the substitution Im­
plied in the minor premise, or, stating this in conventional 
terma, when the substitution Is performed the result is the 
64 
clear necessary form of reasoning that is commonly referrsd 
to as tha inductive mothod, i .e. ,  from the particular to the 
general.  Can this be rigorously proved, this transformation? 
Certainly, if  we look to Euclid's proof. 
"Magnitudes which have tha same ratio to the 
same are equal to one anotherj and magnitudes 
to which the saiae has tho 3aroe ratio are Qouala 
For let eaoh of tha magnitudes A, 2 have the 
same ratio to A, C, I  say that A is equal to B 
for otherwise each of the magnitudes would net 
have the san» ratio to C. But i t  has, therefore 
A equals 3, Again, lot C have the same ratio to 
each of the magnitudes A, 8. I  say that A equals 
3 for ofc/is rwis3 C would not havo the sane ratio 
to eaoh of the magnitudes A, B but i t  has, there­
fore A equals 3." 
Q.E.D. C t  A i t  C I E •  A equals B 
The moderns are proud that they have been able to 
reduce all  of the Aristotelian logic by recourse to their 
new notational system to a thing of minor importance* They 
substitute the forms, 
(1) if  p, then p 
(2) if  p then p or q 
(3) if  p implies q, q implies p then p if and only if q 
(4) if  p implies q, q  implies r  then r> implies r  
This Includes within the la vis of identity, Lew of 
Simplioation for Logical Addition and the Law of Hypothetical 
Syllogism* They call this Sentential Calculus. Let us take 
an example and see i t  clearly: 
a( "every metal Is malleable" 
al("if x is metal then x is malleable" 
&2("since iron is a metal i t  is malleable" 
a3{ "although clay is not a metal,  i t  is malleable" 
a4{"if wood were metal i t  would be malleable" 
^Euclid's Elements, Prop. 0 -  Book V 
2Alfred Tarskl, Introduction to Logic (Oxford University press 
6th Printing, 1954), pp. 24, 25 
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Thus the uao of these different categories of 
•A* era determined by ether prirKlplac of thalr calculus, 
but at the moment all that is ct importance is to see the " 
form, naturally, it 1? clear that we egain see the ana­
logical function being applied. r;e would write ft .  
x  s  astral jj x is nolle able 
but what of the copula? That Is it to say metal nls" 
malleable? Identity? Certainly not! 
Ill - (o) 0raraiar and Its Abuse cf Metaphors 
Iron is malleable, or we night state the favorite 
logical assertion, "?*an is a rational animal", so th? saying 
goes, but man is a term that la not exheusted by this ss» 
sertion. He may be many things, or one might predicate of 
man any number of attributes and qualities depending upon 
the preference of the individual. The essential thing la 
the use of "is*. Certainly In the example, man ij? a rational 
animal, but only If w© adopt a metaphysical network or matrix 
that seeks essences as the intelligible what ne sis. Hoc.- do we 
know that this defines nsn uniquely? This Is still an open 
question, nationality door not exhaust the nature of mo, 
it only points to one aspect of his life. The definition of 
man should be that he is everything that he does or can do. 
The problem Is, of course, that "is" belongs tc grammar. Not 
the grammar we heve inherited from the medieval logicians 
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and rians, but a c- ,9 , Tnav nf n—i C. o-viiar 01 relations. The intransi­
tive verb, that has succaasfullv J n^ enootpassed all  ether intran-
sitives Into that pure abstraction «i-w „ ,,  .  a c c i o n  l s  » needs axoninstion, 
•x»" owes i t .  existence to the root *es * „h l o h  M a n ,  t 0  
breathe. There is  no conception that can ( l ,e l ife to "la* 
"" t h 0 U E h  " h , s  «P the root bhu, to pro,,  from 
which*, derive "be* In cor occern renderlnp. Thla iaaue 
ha. bean aeen In all  Its lucidity by Ern-at Fenolloaa In 
hie exoellent work. Aa a direct result ,  he has outlined 
the baala for a new yracrtar demonstrating that relation, 
are the key flpurea In language am our nouns, adjective, 
and the whole order of f .ramatloal terns ao dear to the 
grammarian can readily be eeen to be transitive vnrbs. 
His method of seeking etymologies from the Chinese charac­
ter,  which has preserved i ts ancient structure in i ts form, 
demonstrates both his grasp of the basic metaphors In 
language and his keen intellectual approaoh of l ife.  
He says, 
"You will  ask, how could the Chinese have built  
up a great intellectual fabric from mere pic­
ture writing? * To the ordinary Western mind, 
which believes that thought is  concerned with 
logical categories and which rather condemns 
the faculty cf direot imagination, this feet 
seems quite impossible.  Yet the Chinese lan­
guage with i ts peculiar materials has passed 
over from tho seen to the unseen by exactly 
the samo process which all  ancient races em­
ployed. This process is metaphor, the use of 
material Images to suggest immaterial rela­
tions. 
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The who la dalle ate substance or speech Is built  
upon substrata cf metaphor# Abstract terms, 
pressed by etymology, reveal their ancient roots 
still  embedded In direct action# But the primi­
tive metaphors do not spring from arbitrary sub­
jective processes# They are possible only be­
cause they follow objective lines of relations 
in nature herself# Relations are more real end 
more Important than tfc? things which thsy re­
late# The forces whloh produce the branch-
angles of an oak lay potent intho acorn." 
Again as on example of his approach and his clarity of 
conception, 
"A true noun, an isolated thing, does not exist In 
nature# Things are only the terminal points, or 
rather the mooting point3, of actions, cross-sec­
tions cut through actions, snap-shots. Neither 
can a pure verb, an abstract notion, be possible 
in nature. The eye sees noun and verb as one* 
things in motion, motion in things, and so the 
Chines© conception tends to represent them#^ 
Thus, the universal oop.ila is a reduction cf metaphors until  
a bare abstraction is reached and the noun has the a aas i l­
legitimate status# Y.e should say, "the tree greens itself*, 
not "the tree is green", or as Penollosa says, "the monkeys 
bring forth live young", not "the monkey is a mammal"* Thus 
our question becomes "man, an animal, reasons". And to this 
there can be l i t t le dispute# To the explicit  conorete verb 
returns tho netaphoric content of our language and at the 
same time miraculously absolves problems# 
But returning to the analogy, we oan also state 
it  in a literal form# It  is only necessary to substitute 
the correct relation for the "is to* or "corresponds to" 
Ernest Fenollosa, The Chinese Written Ciaracter fRr*^ 
^Eorton, Publishers, New York, Square $ Series), 'p. * 
2lbId, p. 60 
fTF T~rf 
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and write the connective by some- equivalent fore. (This 
presupposes, of course, the exchange of signs for these 
algebraic symbols), T3y the same token e metaphor is just 
part of an analogy, a rctJo, and expressed as an identity. 
The developer nt of analogies into a matrix from an archetypal 
analogy becomes a theory, thesis, story or tale. If t  h0 terms 
stressed are eigne, we have the scientific theories and 
philosophies that plague the modern minde, But if  symbols 
become the aignifleant element, l iterature, philosophy and 
art flourish. 
It Is interesting to note that Whitehead end Russell 
attempted to reduce logic to mathematics, and lo their work, 
The Principles of Mathematicsthey found It necessary to 
state their basic propositions which they oall their atomio 
and molecular propositions. These propositions are the fun­
damental set of propositions upon which they built their 
rather magnificent structure. These propositions provide 
the basis for mathematics, The symbolic statements for these 
p r o p o s i t i o n s  w e  h a v e  n o t e d  b e f o r e  ( s e e  p a c e  3 0 ,  f o o t n o t e  1 ) ,  
They embody the same form as cur basic analogical notation. 
Whitehead and Russell say of this proposition that these 
statements are accepted as datum "and this belongs to the 
philosophy of logic". Thus the same analogical tool is found 
also underlying modern mathematics as well as symbolic lo^ic 
To illustrete this analogical method In science, 
* Whitehead & Russsll,  The Principles of Mathematics 
p. XV Atomic and Molecular Proposition * n o t® 
we nood analysis end a study of hsple^s work on astronomy. 
Primarily, by borrowing a conic section from a Greek, 
Apollonius, and then taking tho problem of conceptualising 
mathematical data accumulated from astronomical observations, 
we can easily dupllo at a h Is laws • 
Glvonx 
(a) The orbit of a planet 
(b) The sun 
(c) Circumference of a conic section, i .e., 
the ellipse 
(d) The foci of the ellipse 
Methodt The analogical tool 
Result t 
The orbit of a planet is to the sun as the circum­
ference of the ellipse is to the foci; which follows the form 
A I B <1 C t  P. Transform this to another form and we can 
say with all the certainty that we possess, 
"The earth revolves around the heavens traolng 
the path of an ellipse while tho sun Is at ono 
of the foci," 
This we teach to children as one of the scientific truths 
of our age. Later a modern mathematician causes considerable 
trouble when he tells the world, that It is all relative to 
the observer and only the poet seems undisturbed by this 
new scientiflo truth. For what papa Einstein Is really 
saying 13 that the mathematical form Into which you put 
your data will neither dictate the "real" picture of the 
world, nor will It be able to be, In the final analysis, 
4 3  
any noie 'clan an »*3  if* l Q  ^ a n  analogy. 
Of cou rso ,  j£op Is  r '  c other fv? o lav/a an of the sar/ j  form 
and are easily snov.-n as analogies;  one concerns arois and 
trie oti ior distances,  which ara both said to bo proportional 
to the t ir io o* the revolution about the oircuafere-ico of 
tha el l ipse.  
Conversely,  a l l  theories can be reduced to sys­
tems of analogies whose tc-rms are ordered to the extent 
necessary for ths part icular rigor required.  The sciences 
that  have been blessed with tho t i t le "exact* havo re­
lated their  terms or eloign ts  in ths analogy to other terms 
whose method or order of arrangement is  based upon a method 
of homogenity throughout;  or to state tho motter simply,  
i t  would bo enough to say that  the elements are ari thmsti-
cized.  The philosophies that  continually clash with one 
another are in fact  stat ing that  their  particular analogy 
*ls* the way the world really is .  had the study of analogy 
been among their  loves,  they might have been able to dls-
oern that  each theory demonstrates another way the world 
may be considered when exchanging metaphors.  
If  our statenont of analogy and science is  sound, 
we should suspect that  the analogical  method of comparing 
phenomena to soma model,  physical  or theoretical ,  when i t  
encounters difficulty or is  unsuccessfully employed, would 
be incapable of proceeding to new conceptions or to new pres-
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entational models of phenomena. The oonsequenoes would bo 
obvious. It would be a bar to prediction and the temporary 
abandonment of new theoretical systems to synthesize the 
facts of science. Modern physics as the forerunner of science 
certainly would encounter this If it were true# and, hence, 
It Is to them we must turn. Primarily, a model is either true 
or false and the test lies in its being "compared directly 
with actual facts.But today the scientist finds great 
difficulties In this, and thus Schrodlnger aaya, "This is 
usually not the case with models."^ In its place, they use 
a new tern "adequate" which supplants true and false models 
and the test is "seeing whether the expectation were reas­
onable • 
"Probably we oannot ask for more than Just adequate 
pictures capable of synthesizing in a comprehensible way all 
observed facts and giving a reasonable expectation of new 
ones we are out for."4  
A dual problem is now active. On the one hand, 
science has inherited the diotum of Plato's Timeaus to find 
a model or idea capable of expressing and "saving the ap-
pearanoes." The procedure was to continually approach a near 
perfect model by continual patch-work, and perhaps never reach 
It owing to human Imperfections., Schrodlnger a«yS ,  „j k  
1 oannot gueos from the ever Incomplete circumstantial evidence 
of experiments what nature really is iiu-
I But Without an 
E. Schrodlnger, Sclet." & Kumftnjwra (pp-ms 71 " "— — 
Press, 1951), P .  22 *' <Caa i jridge University 
2  Ibid., p. 24 
5  Ibid., p. 24 
4  Ibid-, P. 24 
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absolutely precise model, thinking Itself beoomee imprecise 
and the consequences to be derived from the models become 
ambiguous 
The other diffloulty is that a model in this as­
pect or to satisfy this need is no longer possible to con­
struct, l«e., the shift from a true or false to an adequate 
one# This attitude (to construct a perfeot model) has now 
been abandoned. The failures we have experienced no longer 
refer to details, they are of a more general kind. We have 
become fully aware of a situation that may perhaps be 
summarized as follows. As our mental eye penetrates into 
smaller and smaller dlstanoea and shorter and shorter times, 
we find nature behaving so entirely differently from what 
we observe in visible and palpable bodies of our surround­
ing that no model shaped after our large-scale experiences 
can ever be •true*. A completely satisfactory model of 
this type is not only practically inacoesslble, but not 
even thinkable. Or, to be precise, we can, of course, 
think it, but however we think it, it is wrong; not perhaps 
quite as meaningless as a 'triangular circle', but much 
m o r e  s o  t h a n  a  ' w i n g e d  l i o n ' . " 2  
Let us complicate the problem even more. Bohr 
and Heisenberg have developed a theory oalled the principle 
of uncertainty In whioh the thesis Is advanced that by even 
looking at the object of Investigation you distort it, change 
Ibid., p.25 
2 Ibid., p. 2Sf 
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It *Dd thus interfere with it,  by the very aot of observing 
it* Yet, you cannot gain any knowledge about an objeot by 
leaving It atrictly alone and isolated* Those elements left 
to be observed then, upon which a model is to be constructed, 
are only the distorted parte* Schrodlnger believes the way 
to understand this is to realize that they 'mean that the 
object hae no existence Independent of the observing sub­
ject"*' '" And therefore they conclude that the mysterious 
boundary between the subject and object has been pushed to 
the point where there Is no longer the sharp clear boundary 
that once so characterized aolentifio and common^sense no­
tions* Its importance to us, of course, is obvious* The 
model must now Include the observer himself* Thus models 
seem to be, if not impossible, at least extremely difficult, 
to construct* What is Jaft without the struoture of the 
model or the analogy? Mathematical systems of the Caloulus 
of Probability or the Law of Chance, and henoe the reason 
no new theoretical structure presently capable of analogizing 
the faots of science* Until a new analogy is found, there 
can be no new theory of modern soienoes* 
III - (e) Distorted Symbols and Metaphors in Society and 
the Individual^ Web of Analogical Patterns 
Carlo Levi *s work "Of Pear and Freedom" is an 
amazing treatise demonstrating the metaphorlo oontent of 
what might be called a psychological-soolological study of 
^ Ibid*,  p* 50 
mac and history* Us soss that man's basic patterns of be­
havior might truly bo typified as ritualiatio-sacrifieial. 
Thus, he says, if man ia divorced from his gods, he pro­
jects this same pattern that made his diety sacred upon the 
state, the clan and his beliefs. Eence, everything is both 
sacred and profane. T7© arc told that everything must start 
from the realization of this twin aspect of feeling and 
projection. Ee is saying that the unexamined matrix that 
is the unreflected substance of man's beliefs brings him 
to that end which ia the outcome of primitive-matrix. Es 
says, "For men, incapable of liberty - who cannot stand 
terror of the sacred that manifests itself before their open 
eyes - must turn to mystery, must hide and worship as a dark 
symbol, tho very revelation, the shining light of truth."1  
It Is important to see this process but in a less 
symbolic fashion than that in Carlo Levi's work. Unless 
this is done, the element that distorts analogical matrioes 
might continue to be obscure. 
Throughout an individual's life, he builds his own 
matrix and the process ia not unliks the solution to a cross* 
word puzzle. It is important to note that this prooesa is 
both a conscious and unconscious one. Unconscious, not in 
the psychological sense, but in what Carl Jung might ap­
propriately find a correspondence to in the feeling function-
In man. The unconscious or the feeling pattern of the indi-
1  C&rlo Levi, Of Fear & Freedom (Earper Bros.) 
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vidual may become expliolt, and whan this is attempted we 
have the fertile field from which the Platonic dialogues 
have sprung. The rendering explicit of the hidden premisas 
is often a tenuous and dangerous task - as both Socrates 
and the modern analyst havo found - since both involve the 
problem of transference. Yet, it la absolutely essential 
that man establish such a network of ideas and feelings upon 
whioh to build his life, for this is material from which all 
thought springs. The danger of metaphors is not in that 
they may deceive us, or the trouble is not in the realization 
that the analogical structure lies at the basis of nearly 
all thought and therefore may not be seen as an "as if", for 
these are only linguistic or philosophical errors. The errors 
are only fraught with difficulties when belief is added to 
the matrix. But why and how Is belief added to the matrix? 
Why not admit the flux of the unknown? is It the fear that 
we may be swamped by the unknown? What Is the genesis of 
our clinging to our systems of belief? If we choose our 
own analogical systems, or philosophies, why is the feeling 
element so strong? What are we strengthening ourselves 
against? Ideas? Certainly that would be absurd if we in 
turn manufactured our own systems. 
But it has been said that one does not choose a 
philosophy, the philosophy does the ohoosing. in psychology, 
this takes the form of the statement that the psychological 
developing nt determines the philosophy man chooses. The 
cautious philoeophic thinker views this somewhat more mun­
danely, stating that whatever analogical structure a man 
chooses, he will either distort i t  to Justify his own 
actions or force i t  to account for the paradoxes he is 
presented with in life. The inability to resolve a real 
paradox inevitably brings about the destruction cf the 
previously successful matrix of ideas. When man cannot 
account for or Justify his feelings or experiences, he is 
confronted with th9 unknown. It  is always the unknown that 
be attempts to master and limit.  Soienoe of the last few 
centuries has been given the task of pushing back the sea 
of the unknown and i t  is only lately that we realize the 
dykes we built  have been made with loa3 than sand. The 
engulfing sea, soma realized, had never really receded. It  
was only the low tide that had lulled many into a fal3s 
security. The familiar and known is restful but often we 
are dimly aware that there is a strange aspeot to even the 
mo3t familiar.  Strangeness is uncomfortable and alien. The 
finite can be assimilated into oneself by being made a 
part of the already familiar matrix of warm, sane and safe 
analogies. To admit the too-different tegs Isolation and 
strangeness. One can always kill  a stranger. The Greek word 
for barbarian is barbaros and i t  also means stranger. 
The feeling cf a strange apprehension of dread with-
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out any apparent assignable cause is one characteristic of 
coming close to the stranea presence of the unknown. Our 
dread of the unknown arises in the fear that It night. In 
• one 1 next r la able manner, guide ua to some sinister r.nd. 
Yet, It Is not the end that vre really fear hut the separation 
of the ties that are warm, comfortable and enslaving. These 
ties or chains fix us to the Images we worship and the sac­
rifice they demand is ourselves. The images are the objects 
of our desires and passions - those things that shut out 
the fearful, those things that keep the meaningless rv*ss 
from ua, and, even for a moment, l ift us into a realm we 
wish to return to again and again. These objects are the 
things we love, are fond of, hold dear and fondle. They 
are the things we fight for and die for, anl they are also 
the Ideas we have of God, Religion, Polltlos, and philosophy. 
They are all the things that keep us In our small narrov 
Uvea, whioh In turn keep us from grasping the Infinite. 
More properly, they are the things that constitute the death 
we oall life, and the fear of the life we call death. The 
grasping for the unknown means the abandonment of the fa­
miliar ties and the aooeptanoe of that whioh really is, and 
not what we project from our most "sure" matrices. 
To isolate and, if possible, to camouflage and 
conceal the unknown, we transform the family, the group and 
the nation into a clannish and belligerent beryl of care-
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of critical need, aa the fori Is Identical* 
• -i « 
?h© inporsonnlity of nature can only be exce e 
by t h o  I n d i f f e r e n c e  o f  n a n  t o  m a n ,  I t  i 3  t h i s  w e  f ~ a ~ ,  
we appease, and this, strangely, wo worship# Ka n  ^- s  
real enemy of nan -  mors destructive and vicious than 
powers once attributed to tho Jealous god3 • "£ot t  Ban is 
only a hunk of natter and matter,  as such, contains no such 
attributes and, as such, man is not capable of such predica­
tions, Within nan li<33 the stanch} there the eternal battles 
still  rage, and only occasionally doe3 light become victo­
rious over darkness. On such occasions some leader usually 
has shown the archetypes to be inadequate for their purpose. 
The medicino is invariably love or some new doctrine that is 
yet not capable of being incorporated Into a now set of pat,  
neat and explicit  archetypes. Christianity, Buddhism and 
much that is in the Hindu Tradition can be seen in this light, 
V7e need not bs over-Joyous, for man will  continue to build 
new altars to that which he would enslave and imprison, if  
one temple is destroyed, another will be built ,  "his 13 
the human condition -  to change the sacred into the profane} 
the spiritual into a dogma of belief; the fine and noble 
into the perverted and base; end justice into la w .  yn  
man's folly resides in that he believes l0  human soluMo 
p rob l em s  ha  i s  no t ,  on  occa s ion ,  su r e  a r e  h u man .  I t  a l / S  ̂  
lies in the presumption that we, as we are in 
n  ®U 1 '  "arrow U n .  
£0 
enlightened stage, oan bring forth enough wisdozn to establish 
justice and tranquillity in our lives and within societies. 
We seek to enforce a probable structure upon somethlne that 
may be in its essence structureless. 
But we need only look at man. He builds a v/all 
of ideas about himself to protect himself from his own naked­
ness and tragic isolation, Han has not yet realized that 
the stranger he most fears is deep within himself. Y.e are 
ail strangers, alone and separate, encompassed by the ter­
rible wastes Ox nothingness. v,e project our terrors upon 
the world and ssek cures for them in the outward acts of man. 
This is what the Buddhists call the realm of Sansara. 
To keep the dreadful unknown at bay, we build arid 
patoh up our systems of analogies. To give them more reality 
and finality, to substitute the system for reality itself, 
society indulges in those barbarisms that historians oare-
fully rscord. The unknown is transformed into the known and 
the holes are filled by faith, belief and the unspoken 
mysteries. All is secure until the doubter arrives, in a 
closed society he meets a bitter end. if the society clings 
to tho matrix as a reel substitute for reality, thsre is little 
to be done but watch the implications of the symbols themselves 
carry on the destruction. The churoh of love allows an in­
quisition all in the name of truth. Dogmatism is the in­
evitable result, and if the social iorces are unleased then 
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destruction Is the progeny, and chaos the harvest. Taboos, 
either aacred or secular, must have their penalties. To 
gain life without them I3 mere suggestion of conduct. But 
what of life, death and those horrible questions of sin, evil 
and the gods? Can man walk naked among such dreadful company? 
An "as if" solution Is hardly a solution for a society who 
counts among its memoirs those that feel a need for the solaoe 
of belief and the solution of problems. They will and do 
defend what they cannot understand. Thus, a Socrates in 
offered up In sacrifice to belief-filled analogical struc­
tures of the Athenians. Paradoxically, Socrates stayed to 
meet this fate rather than flee, repent or escape, to demon­
strate that the very things his society clung to were ground­
less and only deceptively distorted images of the.reality 
they sought, it  is interesting that the philosopher, Aristotle, 
who thought that the highest good could not he kncren, fled 
Athens lest she commit the same sin twice. Ke retired to 
C halo is as soon as danger threatened. Different from See rates, 
he had no ethics that could meet any serious test with the 
forces of irrationality. The Bishop of Verden, Dietrich Von 
51aheln, In the Medieval Age reacted in a similar way to that 
of the mob at Socrates* time when ho wrote, 
"whenever the existence of the Church is threatened 
is released from the commandments of morality vifrb 
unity as the end, the use of every moans is sine????.* 
even ounning, treachery, violenoe, simony, orisen 
death. For all order is fcr the sake of the 
and the individual must be sacrificed to the coSon '  
good .  
De-Schismate Libr 111 
A.D. 1411 
52 
Y.'a need not turn to the early pages of history for examples 
of those who sought to defend their pet systems of analogies 
from attack or doubt. All totalitarian systems have their 
sacred profanity* and if  this is questioned the same end 
can be posited as -.veil as the same methods. Marxism in 
its form of political nommunisrc and the modern Fascist 
state are filled with examples to note. 
Yet* wo have assumed a very interesting meta-
phorio expression, "project", which neods analysis. True, 
the atrange attraction and repulsion to this terrible un­
known provides the foundation for much of our need to sym­
bolize but, nevertheless, i t  is too simple, putting aside 
our Journey into the rhetorical,  we must ask, "haw project," 
"upon what" and "Just how is this manipulated". Let us 
take a simple case and expand i ts latent content and discover 
Its pruner resolution, -"he element of hate in nan is often 
projected, we are told by the psychologists.  Perhaps, i t  
would be therefore desirable to start here. 
( a )  
Objection 
( b )  
Objection! 
( a )  
Objection; 
T hate John Smith. 
Vihat does i t  moan for the "I" to hate? 
I  have a hatred for John Smith. 
How does one have i t? Like an arm 
the moon or a spoon? 
I  feel an emotion which I  call ho** 
which I  feol for John Smith. 
How can one feel for John Smith? 
S3 
(d) J foaX an emotion which I  call hato which 
I  project upon John Smith as the object 
of my fas line. 
Objection; Project? h'ow? Carry i t  over? Place i t  
upon hin° 
( e )  I  f e e l  o n  e m o t i o n  w h i c h  I  c e l l  h a t r e d  w h l o h  
causes a feeling, of tension within ns; as 
a result I  soak i ts resolution by reacting 
to an objeat that appears to threaten cy 
previous placid stete .  
Naturally, this process could go on to further ex­
plore the content of the terms "call",  "seek", "object" and 
"appears* for these are all  heavy terms that tend to obscure 
the notaphoric content they possess within this oontext. 
The point is clear, however, that language utilized at any 
of these different stages would have vastly different results,  
be i t  psychological or sociological.  The more complete the 
analysis the more the investigation would tend to find the 
basis for the hatej henoe, the easier i ts resolvetse nt,  but 
only If our activity were not entirely Intended to disem­
bowel poor John Smith. 
The analogical structure for Mr. I  and John Smith 
might be viewed in this form; 
tranquil state :  turbulent state : :  
a non-threatened matrix :  a threatened matrix s i  
the understanding of the matrix; 
the blind and immediate acceptance of the matrix : :  
understanding action * emotionally base action 
The question would then tend towards the uncovering of Just 
what i t  is that is threatened and why a oertain action saeras 
to be consistent with tho understanding of i t .  The unoover-
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log of this content would bring light upon Mr. i'» behavlor-
iatio patterns and aocount for many missing elements. It 
should be noted that the further the analysis oontlnuea, the 
clearer it becomes that the once explicit non-metaphorlo 
statement, "I hate John Smith." becomes a highly analogical 
statement with subtle avenues to be profitably investigated. 
Thus, the organism, the violent Kr. I in our case, 
provides the occasion for valuable insighta. Primarily, it 
appears that the root of the difficulty is non-verbal - an 
emotion or a feeling of acute tension. In the attempt to 
establish so equilibrium within the individual so that his 
adaptation to the environment may continue pleasurably, our 
Mr. I might act upon any one of the oategorlea we have enu­
merated. The Inner equilibrium stands as polar opposite* 
to the Immediate external objeots and when the tension is 
coupled with a matrix on at least the sign level, the 
organism responds. That is to say, behavioriatio expansions 
will be based upon the subject's formulation of the content. 
If he reacts upon the basis of early emotional archetypes, 
his conduct will tend to give substantiation to the Oedipus 
complex thesis. The important thing will be how far his 
process of symbolism is consistent with his feeling-matrix 
of analogies, if his symbolized environment oould not ex­
pand to take In larger units of the environment and thereby 
be fulfilled, he will be, in the terms of psychology, rs-
pressing certain contents # .f„ ,  Actua l l y ,  t h i s  i s  t an t amoun t  to 
saying that if  the i r x U v i d n o i  d i v i d u a l  f i nds  t ha t  c e r t a i n  nece s s a r y  
feeling-signs, when verbalized •-« w «  s eem t o  demand  consequences  
that are not sanctioned «rvi i-r ^ , •Lu ima  and  i f  he  neve r the l e s s  s t i l l  c l i ngs  
to his emotional-archetype, „ riod a case of either »-
tression or fixed complex. The analyst .11! then attempt 
to reconstruct the pattern of analgias to . . .  .here sod 
why the distortion has been fixed or .hat Iteeps It from 
expanding and thereby assimilating the content. 
I l l  -  ( f )  Signs and  Symbols 
The terms in analogy or the Metaphor may either be 
aigas or symbols, if  signs, they may be either natural signs 
or artificial,  A simple natural sign shows the revereibility 
of cause and effect as in thunder and lightning. The phenome­
non of lightning may inform us of the consequent thunder in 
a short interval of time, or, contrary*lae, thunder may in­
form us of the existenoe of lightning. An artificial sign 
is a set response we have elicited for the purpose of setting 
an indication of a future pattern of events. This could 
easily be the blast of a horn to warn of the approaching auto, 
start of a race or any purpose we agree upon, its meaniDg 
must first be agreed upon and then appropriate behavior fol­
lows. its meaning, as also in the natural sign, depends 
upon a pattern in which the term in question is meant to 
hold a dominant position. Thus, i t  has two sides - one the 
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logical and the other psychological.  Or simply# ohjsc 
must be meant and a subjeot most be capable of using the 
term* If a term la capable of oonveying a meaning# i t  Bust 
than be explicitly determined so that the consequences of 
the term or sign can be readily seen. A sign in this sense 
stands as a proxy for the objeot or pattern. A sign indi­
cates or signifies a larger whole of which i t  itself is only 
one aspeot. Suoh is the smoke-fire incident. Smoke is a sign 
of a pattern in which fire plays a large role and thus# we 
are aoouatomed to speaking, "where there is smoke, there is 
fire". The smoke is more easily seen, i t  is visible when tte 
fire itself may not be, i .e. ,  a sign may signify what is 
usually more apparent, more peroeptible, and therefore more 
available, than the total pattern of whioh i t  signifies as 
a part.  This is the great beauty of employing signs. 
If we abstract the commonness of objects, wa have 
the concept of an object,  if  we tend to consider the meaning 
of an object or pattern to reside in this oommonnesa of oon-
oeption, we have one theory, but if  we consider the heal con­
tent of a symbol to lie forever beyond the possible abstrac­
tions, we have another. This is the great dividing UD 6 .  
Do ooncepts exhaust the content of reality by abstracting 
their sameness? Thl. is an old argument that has Its roots 
with the creeks and i t  is not essential at the moment to 
attempt to resolve this, 7*hat is important though ia  that 
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there is always an "other" cr a "(Jifferene® with 
ject or pattern that is not oonimunieated in the explio*^ 
rendering of the symbol's content# Because no  matter ho 
two or more things may be alike* they are always differ00*1  
in at least one respect from each other or else we could 
not call them two. 
Our language order also determines meaning. The 
sentence, "Jim Smith hates you", does not mean either* 
"Me hates Joe Smith" or "Smith hates Jim me." Thus* sen­
tence order or grammar plays a large role. But this can 
be set aside for the moment as tacitly assumed and under­
stood. 
Often the object to which the sign belongs as a 
part is difficult to handle, for whatever reason* and 
therefore the sign exists to signify the greater whole, 
which may be obscure at the moment. Signs announce the 
object to the observer. 
Symbols function .3 a tool to conoelva the objeot 
or the pattern as a whole, Jim smith aa a oamo can be a 
sign and a symbol. As a sign It serves In a three-fold 
manner, subject -  sign - object. Aa » symbol It functions 
in a four-fold manner, subject -  symbol -  conception - 0b-
jeot. This latter funotlon is often oallad fv. aAAac  the process 0f 
denotation. The important and often oowpleX problem 
as to the relation of the "name" and the « '  
coject" whioh is 
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to bear tha nana. We have said that the whole or the pat­
tern which i t  refers to la the key to understanding the .  
symbol. The pattern or the concept ion i t  conveys provides 
tha neoessary terra -  connotation. The connotation of a 
symbol is just that conception of the whole that i t  conveys 
to the subject.  The connotation of a sign, speaking loose­
ly for the moment, is Just that to which i t  refers end no 
more nor less. The name Jim Smith means just that man 
and no other. Yet, the conoeption we have of Jim Smith, if  
we give him human attributes and add to i t  a store of 
psychological differences and behavior patterns, constitutes 
the connotation of Jim Smith. An example of this i3 in the 
different appellations given to men in primitive and civi­
lised societies, in the more primitive, the nam© is given 
to indicate a man's virtues and character but not so in 
modern states. Primitives desire to ccnnote meaning in 
names, while civilized states prefer only to signify la a 
name. Mr. Sharp need not have excellent vision in civilized 
states, but in a primitive state, i t  would bo proper to give 
i t  only to a "hawk-eye". 
At t imes, men's analogical matrices do seem to 
represent soma of the dominant aspects of the creative flux, 
and unless they guard against ths explicit  rendering of 
their systems into a literal "truth" or some ontologioul 
status, they unknowingly sow the seeds for a vast dogmatism. 
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If the terras or symbols they discover throw light upon some 
obscure but important facet of life, then they oan profitably 
weave a new system of philosophy, religion or a new work of 
poetry. The new light thus gleaming will undoubtedly advance 
the cause of understanding. The insight will be expanded in 
aj.1 its implications and, if not by the original discoverer, 
it  will be done by others who do not share the unexamined 
premises of the founder. Again, if this process of expansion 
of the symbol's content seems to injure the system as a whole, 
then all that is really being done is that the metaphor is 
taken ontologioally and reduced to its absurdity. It will 
always be absurd, since it is putting horns on a hare. By 
solving one problem the issue remains on a higher level. 
How did the world ccane into creation? God created it.  Why 
2® create it? To fulfill what lacked. For what end? 
Is It different than He? What transformation did the world 
undergo? Wlay is He hidden? Where does He hide? Can man 
find him? What does man do to find Him? - and all the 
host of questions that are born from first accepting a 
rhetorio answer to a literal problem without recognizing 
the basic structure. 
Nevertheless, certain larger symbols seem to cap­
ture oertain aspects of reality and these are the fruit of 
all serious thought, but they who take these as literal 
truths encounter the difficulties that we have already out-
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lined. These larger symbols or metaphors are ways in whloh 
the vast aspects of reality can be portrayed but they are 
always under the form of an "as if", never an "equal to". 
The only way out of this morass is to recognize the metephoric 
content and see if it might have a pragmatic use in a certain 
content for the individual, if not, reject It. if so, ao-
cept it for that purpose, yet seeing it as a myth for what­
ever purpose the moment holds# 
IV - Analogy in the Metaphysio of the Non-Dual and the Literal 
Rendering of the Dualist 
The conclusion is of course obvious einoe there is 
nothing really to conclude. The language we use tends to 
obscure the baslo analogical structure and when we are 
cognizant of this truth, It becomes obvious that language 
cannot exhaust reality. The proof is quite simple sine® 
the natural corollary to the truth that two things can be 
related in at least one way la that two things are different 
in at least one way. Thus, the Important thing is not that 
things are related but that the relation oan be verified. 
Hence, i t  follows that ideals or "truths" presented in lan­
guage stand as challenges to be verified, tested and re­
discovered. They can never themselves he the Truth. Truth 
Is beyond relations, as Bradley points out, but the validity 
i s  n o t  i n  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n  i s  a s  t h e  w o r d s  i n d i o a t e ,  f o r  
words refer to an "as if"; the validity lies In the experl-
til 
enoe that sees the "as if" as adequate to convey the content 
of the experience, if the individual has not experienced 
that content then he cannot confirm the method. Thus, that 
particular "as if" must be forever silent to him. it must 
remain as an opinion, perhaps as a borrowed truth, or as 
Plato would say, "a right opinion". Our ways of pointing 
to the truths of philosophy are not to be taken for the 
Truth itself. The reality that is sought or an aspect of 
it  must be known on the intimate terms of personal experience 
or else the truth must always remain as a hypothetical prem­
ise to the individual sinoe he has not verified it* 
Some experiences are-so intense that differences 
in reality are obliterated, in this state, the non-dualist, 
i .e., the mystio, sees that all real differences are only 
apparent* It is seen that reality contains no autonomous 
parts, no dualistlc relations, nor can language, therefore, 
present this experience* This is Eunyata, Nirvana and 
realisation of the Godhead. 
The philosophies that are clearly cognizant of 
this are the non-dual systems, whether of the East or of the 
tt 'est. In the East, they have had a long uninterrupted period 
of growth, while in the Vlest, they have not always been 
favored with such fortunate circumstances, scattered seeds 
have fallen in the ¥:est, but not too many blossomed, while 
in the East the harvest was, and is, rich. Those who have 
experienced reality as non-dual have also been cognizant of 
the faot that language cannot express this content since 
In this experlenoe no relations are discerned that could be 
differentiated from the whole. Thus, they have a tendenoy 
to disparage words and the vehicle that employs them. I t  
Is not that they are against reason, but that they see that 
the faoulty of reason operates by employing relations and 
setting them within a content* But such datum le not re­
vealed in the experlenoe of reality.  They tend to preserve 
the purity of the experlenoe by their adamant refusal to 
represent that experlenoe within any metaphoric content.  
Or If  they do, the symbolic form Is so opposed to reason 
as to sound utterly contradictory and incomprehensible.  
At t imes they have employed a form of reasoning that has 
Its analogue In Euclid's reduotio ad absurdum} such are the 
writings of Plato and Shankara, their main and paramount 
vantage point invariably being the reduction of all  dualisti  
system? to absurdity by exploiting: the symbols that are 
taken l i terally.  It  does not matter how dear a symbol might 
be to the exponent} if  i t  is meant to exhaust and render 
intelligible this experlenoe, i t  will  neoessarlly be distort  
I t  is for this reason that all  dualistio systems, as well  as 
those "qualified non-duallstlc" systems, when they are ex­
amined carefully are judged guilty of spurious reasoning* 
Often the advocates of dualistio systems, if  they themselves 
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tend to treat their doctrines metaphorically and not resllv 
as l i terally true, have other considerations before them 
than that of purity of form, doctrine and teaching. They 
apeak of keeping the dualistic qualities for those not cap­
able of accepting this terrible truth, or for those who need 
an object for the devotional sides of their nature, or,  agcln 
for the deduotions by others with less rigorous minds, which 
might precipitate them into an indifference of nihilism# Some 
feel the changes that would be necessary in their own doctrines 
might make i t  too unpalatable for the loyal followers and 
hence might nod in agreement but never vocally present their 
opinions. They believe our t ies to tradition and custom 
must be preserved for the integrity of aoolety. This 3a 
sometimes spoken of as the great l ie and i t  matters l i t t le 
if the reference is to Plato or to Dostoyeveky'a "Possessed*. 
In spite of this apparent high price to pay or the problematic 
changes that might take place, the metaphyslo of the non-dual 
frames this truth within a context of purity. Whether history 
and society suffer as a direct result is the price for maturity. 
In the West, this has often been termed the ration­
alist-mystic thesis because i t  has a peculiar dislike for 
reducing the highest experience to terms of those of the 
Christian triad. It  is observed that they reject the essen­
tial teaching of Christianity by ignoring the divine-human 
encounter within the oontext of history. The result is a 
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t imeless expanse that la impersonal and void of meaning by 
feeing notamorphcs ed into an undifferentiated mass of pray 
nothingness.  The Hebraic—Christian tradition preserves and 
guards history and the human personality as penultimate 
categories upon which to rest both religion and the order 
which may be found in society. Indeed, this rational-
mysticism may be the result  of "Hellenic" influence that 
has plagued theologians, which Is an accurate evaluation 
only if  we forget the Creek, Plato. The issue is an old 
one. Jn the Vedanta tradition, this takes the form of 
Shankars vs.  Eamanuja. Shcnkara, the great non-dualist ,  
is  asked what is  the nature of the world of appearances, of 
Kaya, which certainly doos not appear as non-dual.  V?hat Is 
the status of the appearances? Are they il lusory? XJon-axist-
ent7 Th© flow of appearances, of l iaya, is  the ground for 
history and the stuff of which the dreams of the persona nty 
are made. To consider this as i l lusionary la tantamount to 
admitting that mystioisrs of the non-dual may handle the 
non-dual world but is incapable of either understanding the 
flux that is history and the values that constitute the 
structure of society. Again, if  the real is non-dual,  then 
what of the phenomenal aspect.  This ie st i l l  the major issue 
and i t  may be that all  l inguistic expressions betray this 
Ketaphoric archetypal problem. Put our adversary night state 
thet this is a purely l i teral non-metaphoric issue because 
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as a ra­the realm of Maya or  ignorance is  immediately fel t  
suit  of perceiving reali ty ,8  dual.  Fence,  this is  no 
metaphor but a l i teral  proposit ion,  i t  la thereby legit imate 
to ask the nature of Mayo. V.here i t  is? what and how i t  la 
produoed -  and, moet important,  what is  the validity of a 
definit ion that  i t  ie logically aelf-oontradiotory.« But i t  
must be noted that  al l  of these questions are only valid If  
we f irst  grant to Maya ox ie to nee.  The o one acue noes are im­
mediately manifest  for tho question presupposes that  Maya la 
a part  and different from the non-dual,  whioh is  absurd,  i t  
might be profitable to eee thle clearly.  Naturally,  our 
main interest  in this ia not one of ascertaining the "ooi 'ract* 
status of Maya, but  in seeing, that  any logloal deductions 
from a str ict ly non-dual,  non-metaphorlo assert ion lead to 
an absurdity.  Kaya may be considered as a symbol,  but,  If  
so,  then i ts  importance l ies in seeing the oonsequeooes of 
taking a l i teral  meaning of a metaphor.  
primarily,  the assumption of truth necessari ly pre­
supposes i ta non—dual oharaoter and thie can be sean quite 
olearly.  If  the experienoe or insight into truth were to 
disclose a duali ty,  then the cognition must have ascertal  ned 
in some way both aspects and therefore bo non-dual.  If  i t  
were to know only one aspect,  then where oonee thle concept 
of "other"? I te appearance,  the "other",  would be Indloatlre 
of the fact  that  I t  can or le known, Put the reply 1.  known. 
M j  „ _ >, ,4 nr both real  and non—real.  *Kaya is  characterized as being 
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Does known sasn exhausted? obviously* known means known and 
not not-known. Therefore* If to know the dual means anything*^ 
It  Is a confession of Incomplete knowing and then why 1» It  
necessary to consider It  as a theory of knowing If at the on­
set i t  can promise so little? 
Thus* dualism is no solution, nor le monism. Monism 
would give to the absolute the characteristics of man* would 
weave an anthropomorphic symbolism In order to account for 
the universe and Its relation to the absolute. Theism fares 
no better and It  would be best to dispense with It  with the 
same critloism. Primarily* i t  needs an objeot of love and 
devotion and therefore limits and reduces the infinite to 
more manageable analogioal terms. The finite needs a finite 
object to love, and an object for devotion. This may be 
necessary as religion but as philosophy, It  Is poor reasoning. 
Plato's Symposium demonstrates that the true love needs an 
object that is eternal* beautiful and of the highest good. 
That Is the love of the Good In Platonlsm and philosophy be­
comes Ita handmaiden. But most theistio systems reject a too 
quick flight into the absolute non-dual. 
Y/e can assert the absolute but if we attempt to for­
mulate i ts relationship to the finite* we will Inevitably fall  
nctim to some logical contradiction. Thus what is the rela-
MOB between the finite end Infinite, between Brahman and K«ya? 
Can there be a system that Is non-dual without oontradiotlng 
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Itself? 
Pamanuja ao3 other critics object to !Jaya being char­
acterized aa both real end non-real, or as both existent and 
non-existent.. They ere right In their criticism, if Maya Is 
meant within their understanding of thoso terms, Eut what 
is opposite to what exists? Something that cannot exist. 
An example rrould be a round square or a son of a barren woman. 
;:hat is existence? That which oan never be contradicted, 
hon-existence ia not what is always unreal but v/lint can never 
bo said to exist. Essentially, this is the distinction between 
contraries end oppoeltes. Jfeya is that which thought csnnot 
overcome. Th© insight of knowledge is none other then the 
realization of Self in the object. Thus the object as separate 
io removed. Its objectivity is removed and its previous 
objectivity has no reality in the light of know lodge. Yet, 
it  has soms existence. T'e can face it and at the same time 
it can be overcome. Therefore, frcn this standpoint the 
absolute is unimpaired by tho previous multiplicity of the 
world of forms • 
Our critics may still ask what la the relation of 
Maya to the Absolute, of AJnsba to Erahman? Let us try the 
Y^clldj-an reductic again. Assume the question la ans*-9red. 
t hs u would tho demonst ratIon cf the deduction necessitate? 
Primarily, it  crest find a relation common between the two 
terms in question in order to properly relate them. It would 
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also assume that this is a necessary connection. But new 
even with a finite object, it is impossible to exhaust its 
nature since it oan be related in innumerable ways. How are 
we to choose precedence? Not to raise the further embarrass­
ing paradox of Bradley's terns in relation, it appears that 
this attempt at a neoeesary connection is impossible and much 
more impossible in its application tc the infinite. Sankara 
In calling Maya inexplicable does not thereby explain it.  He 
is saying that it  is something that oannot be understood. 
Avidya, the objsotivity present to the individual's 
consciousness, is absorbed into self-oonaoiousnssa whore no 
distinction of any ontologipai nature is possible. To ask 
how Ajnans or Avidya belongs to the Jiva, the individual, 
is meaningless, for that is its nature -  its nature as deter­
minate. Jiva has meaning only in Mayaistio terns. To ask 
how it is related without examining the question itself is 
foolish. Indeed, the question presupposes an ontological 
distinction being made that the protagonist refuses to admit 
is thorn. Ramenuja, as the critic., gives Maya statue by 
raising the question in the form given and then dares some-
ones to answer it .  Maya is not an "ifj does not belong to 
Brahman or Jiva, for to belong implies "something" that can 
"belong". This is Just what is denied. 
Thus, it  seems evident that pamanuja stands guilty 
O J .  fcho charge and that our example does set out to prove what 
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its intent was, hence, a CJ.E.D. aa Euclid ,/ould have i t .  
The mystic thesis in Buddhism nay easily be seen to be that 
of the non-duali3t,  or,  at least,  tho Mahayana school, while 
in Indian mysticism, i t  may not be eo easily reduced» The 
charge may be that It  is only the "Buddhist in disguise", or 
j-ian.-iara, who Is the non-dualist that was won over to the 
doctrine of Sunyata far too hastily. To easo the critic, it  
may be prudent to line up a group of quotations t«> suhsfcan-
t_auS our claim though It  really isn't  necessary, since the 
very source of Buddhism lias in. the reform movement ' , ' i thin 
t*iQ context of Indian philosophy. Recalling that the non-
dual is without relations of any ontological status does not 
therefore mean that i t  la without oontent. It is unavoid­
able that in attempting to express this in a statement, there 
is recourse to metaphors that indicate the totality that 
exists in th8 non-dual. Thus, the genesis of the contradictory 
predications is attributed to the subject which is Reality, 
An example to note is from the Kaivalys Upanisads: 
"Prom me everything is born; on me everything is 
supported; into me everything is again dissolved. 
I am Bralman, one without a second. 
I am smaller than the minutest atom, likewise 
greater than the greatest.  I  am the v-hole, the 
diversified-multicolored-lovely-strange unlverse• 
I am the ancient one. I am man, the Lord. I am 
the being-of-Gold. I am the very state of divine 
besutitude. Without hands or feet am i ;  of in­
conceivable power am I; without eyes I see; with­
out ears I  hear; I  knar all  with all  pervading 
wisdom. By nature detached from all  I am, and 
there is none who hno vs ne • Purs spiritual es-
senoe am I, forever. 
•^Kaivalys tfpanlsads, 19-20 
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EtUI It Bight be ai-gj-S that there might ,et be a piece, 
however email,  for Svii« to laeert lU.lt. I,  there en 
explicit  reference where du.ll .n is fienledf 1 D  the greet 
«Tt of Brhafieraojaka-C^oleed, there 1. eapfc.tlc r.D-
o f  t l i i s  3 *  t  r >  ( *  * • »  r » o  * . v  a. Cc.ro evso the greatest Thomas* 
•ror Where there is duality, as i t  were th^* 
sees another, thing) there smells another^ 
t h°1 8  h c a r s  another, another 
th^?'Jnr r 0  s p®fk a  f i n o ther of another thing; 
•  nnt>L« ajothtr,  another thing; there koov f  
- ?  !  another thing; hut how does one to 
b^ mml £ tecorie cars soul, smell an-thinp, 
^anvt'-V » £ #  h 6 a r  a nytMnfi# hoi speak 
+ o O J >  v '  2 u r j t l  anything, hov, knov fin--
?l"nglii?T( f^U, h' »J whoa he knowe &  ±* !-©•»•<*# hov. should he know the knower?1^ 
It lit.fi often been stated that cf the entire corpus 
of the 10o jpanirecs, t.h- most concentrated and compact pre­
sentment of the epitome of these rorke is in Kkodukft TTpnnlBart 
and here, again, there can be l i t t le doubt er to the major 
role that non-dualism plays in Indian Vedantic thought. 
nnly< t^ i n k  nh e  • f o u l ' t h  whose know ledle a^e 
who we r n a  °^e c t 8 '  "OP external,  nor both", 
who has nor, uniform knowledge, who in rot i»,£ 
bi i!  ,In di?! unintelligent, who is invisi-
nroAf '">% o ePuJ-hla, unseisab^e, incapable of 
proof, beyond thought, not to be defined, whose 
«liytfe IV" t h£ b 0 l I e f  l n  t h 0  in whom ®,BPk eP«3  have ceased, who is tranquil,  
blissful,  and without duality." '  
* 2 
The acknowledgment of the highly motaghorlc content 
oi tnougnt-preductions against a ground that is non-dual pre­
sents major difficulties for any teaching. A teaching, therapy, 
JTnfr,?r«dV%P r l n?1 PK® uPa n l £ a c i 3* Vol. II ,  The Brhadaranyaka-
paragraph if" D r* E* E°e r '  P '  2 4 3 '  4 t h  Brabamana, 
2sad T-?aSin i B a d 3» V o 1* Tl  T h 0  Mandukya Upani-sad, .ransl. by Dr. E. Koer, p. 177, Stanza 7.-
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analysis or yoga are nothing but the consequences of the 
basic analogy that ia the teaching. Fraud's theories demand 
a therapy consistent with tha theory that nothing can be in 
the therapy that waa not first implicitly in the theoretical 
formulation* Likewise t  to any science, a a we have previously 
demonstrated, the model or theoretical structure determines 
and limits the oVallable field of Inquiry and demonstration -
a new formulation, a new therapy. This is the rule. Jung's 
new formulation demanded a twist to the Freudian analysis and 
so i t  goes In all  fields. Therefore, what possible teachings 
or yoga could there conceivably be, and yet be consistent with 
the insight that marks the theory, if  the theory in question 
Is a non-dual teaching? The Tibetan works of the Mahayana 
school take this as their central fooua and proceed. As­
suming the non-dual they evolve a doctrine and yoga consistent 
with this insight. They say that when one seeks the mind's 
true essence, "it  is found to be quite intelligible, although 
invisible". The state of the realization of the mind means 
the Insight into the non-dual. It  is defined in a manner 
that we have seen in other non-dual writings. 
"In its true state, mind is naked. Immaculate J 
not made of anything, being of the Voidnssa;.  
clear, vaoous, without duality; transparent; 
timeless, uncompounded, unimpeded, colorless; 
not realizable as a separate thing, but as the 
unity of all  things, yet not composed of them; 
of one of taste and transcended over differen­
tiation."!.  
*W. Y. Evans-we ntz, The Tibetan So ok of the Creat Liberation, 
(Oxford University Press, 1954) p. 211 
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Defining it thus, the yoga or the therapy must, we said, be 
consistent with the teaohing. They state# 
"There being In this yoga nothing objective upon 
which to meditate, how oan one, without having 
ascertained the true nature of mind by meditation 
assert that mind is created. 
and again, 
"the dharma being nowhere else save in the mind, 
there is no other place of meditation than the 
mind. "2  
Yet, this seems to indicate quite clearly that there is a 
meditation and a place to meditate and also a thing to 
meditate on. A dualism persists. This apparent oontradiotion 
some think necessary between the teaching and the practice 
and that it oan never be successfully breached. To this the 
Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation replies, 
"Although there it an innumerable variety of 
profound practices, to one's own mind in its 
true state they are non existent| for there 
are no two things as existence and non-exist­
ence. There are no two things as praotioe 
and practitioner if by those who practice or 
do not practice the practitioner of practice 
is sought and not found, thereupon the real 
of the practice la reached snd also the end 
of the practioe Itself." 3 
The error lies in assuming that the mind either per­
ceives a duality or is part of that duality. Allowing it to 
remain in its primordial consciousness abiding in its own 
place, seems to be the way to deliverance to the thatness. 
Within one's own mind is the center of all, the place where 
* Ibid., p. 212 
2  Ibid., p. 216 
3  Ibid., p. 226 
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oonoe p t s  a r e  m a nu f a c t u r e d  e tx l  who re  t hey  van i sh .  I n  many  
words ,  ove r  and  ove r  aga in ,  t he  work  admon i shes  t he  s t uden t  
t o  t u rn  w i th in ,  s eek  t h e  m ind  t ha t  i s  he r e ,  i . e . ,  on? .  » s  own  
m ind ,  and  one  w i l l  f i nd  t ha t  t o  b e  Sunyuna ,  t he  non -d j a l ,  
"Seek  w i th in  t h ine  own  s e l f - i l l u mi n a t ed ,  s e l f -
originated mind whence, firstly, all  suoh OOD* 
cep t s  a r i s e ,  s econd ly ,  whe re  t hey  ex i s t ,  and  
l a s t l y ,  w h i t he r  t hey  van i sh .  
•T he  r e a l i z a t i on  o f  t he  O n e  Mind  cons t i t u t e s  t he  
A l l -de l i ve  r en ce  •  "  
7 , ' i t h i n  t h e  oon t ex t  . o f  t h i s  t he s i s  i t  appea r s  t ha t  t he  T ibe t a n  
yoga  o f  t h e  non -dua l  goe s  a  s t e p  fu r t he r  t han  ou r  mer e  i n t e l ­
l e c tua l  unde r s t and ing  o f  t he  d o c t r i n e  o f  t he  non -dua l .  I t  
s eeks  t he  non -dua l  w i t h in  i t s  own  t e rms  an d  cond i t i ons .  T he i r  
end  i s  t o  s e e  t h a t  t he  r ea son  o f  man  i s  no t  o rowned  p r i o r  t o  
t he  r ea l i z a t i on  o f  w ha t  l i e s  beh ind  i t .  To  f r e e  t he  mi nd  f rom 
i t s  p ro j ec t i ons  i s  t he  me thodo log i c a l  a pp roa oh  and  t h i s  ap -»  
p ea r s  t o  be  t he  oen t r a l  co r e  o f  t he  t e a c h ing .  Fo r  t he  t ho rn  
t ha t  I s  em bedded  i n  t he  sk in ,  some  sohoo l s  u se  ano the r  t ho rn  
t o  r emove  I t .  f t e  c an  s ee  t h i s  app roach  I n  t he  wr i t i n g s  o f  
o t he r  Buddh i s t  s e c t s .  The  doc t r i ne  expounded  by  Hs i  Yun  
and  r eco rded  by  p»e l  Ks iu  ha s  t h i s  end .  The  p ro b l e m i s  t o  
awaken  I n  man  t he  oonv l c t i on  t ha t  ana ly t i c  r ea son  canno t  
f i nd  t r u th .  I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  end  t ha t  t he i r  r epud i a t i on  o f  
ana ly t i c  r ea so n  becomes  I t s e l f  a  t oo l  t o  b r e a k  t he  h o ld  t ha t  
t h e  con f idenoe  In  r e a son  ha s  on  t he  i nd iv idua l ,  i h e i r  con ­
t en t i on  i s  t h a t  u l t ima t e  r e a l i t y  t r an scends  wha t  c an  b e  ex -
1  ib id . ,  p .  229  
^ jbid., p. 236 
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pressed in words and therefore reason cannot grasp wfcat Tor 
reason is not graspable .  
The 0oxidants of KU-Mon presents this very clearly. 
•words cannot express everything. 
The heart 's message cannot be delivered in words 
If one receives words l i terally he will be lost 
If he tries to explain with words, he will  not 
attain enlightenment in this life.*^ 
Thus, to recapitiiate, i t  might appear that if the 
logical positivisfcs were fully cognizant of their use of 
metaphors, suoh as their "propositions mirroring reality", 
they might have taken their picture of reality and performed 
the neoessary substitution within their logioal proposition 
4.01 to arrive at the enlightening equation* 
a) The proposition is a picture of reality. 
b) The proposition is a model of the reality as 
we think i t  is,  4.01 
Hence, combining a plus b, we arrive at* 
A picture of reality is a modal of the reality as 
we think it  is• 
or, 
The reality of solence to the logical positivist 
is the world as we think i t ,  or, words, words and 
words • 
Carl Jung in his forward to the Tibetan Book of the Great 
Liberation comes to the same thing, but from the psychological 
side, 
"It is dawning upon us to what extent our whole ex­
perience of so called reality is psychic; as a. mat­
ter of fact,  everything thought, felt  or perceived 
is & psychic image, and the world exists only so far 
as we are able to produce an image of i t ." 
2 
^ The Sateless C'ste, Tran3. from Chinese by Hyogen Senzaki 
and Soledin Reps -  p. 55 
^ Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation, Introduction by 
Carl Jung, p, xxxiii  
ffeed we add -  words, words. To ignore the poetry in aclance 
ia to read It  off in confusion, and to ignore the analogical 
structure of things leaves us without that Platonic insight 
that,  as the Timaeus says, i t  is meant to be a "likely story" 
3ut the real loss is in n6t following the consequences that 
are manifest in the non-dual mystio's writings and eo losing 
the possibility of where real knowledge may be found. 
"And the most beautiful of bonds is that which most 
i n ^  o a e  b o t h  1 U e l f  a n d  together,- and to effect this in the 
most beautiful manner is the natural property of 
analogy." J  
(Plato's Timaeus Zlc) 
And as we might add, not be bound by i t .  
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